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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON HIV, MARRIAGE AND EDUCATION IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA
Shannon Phillips
Advisor: Peter Gottschalk
This paper examines the impact of spatial variation in HIV rates on female marriage
rates in Zambia. I formulate a search model that predicts lower marriage rates of
educated females relative to uneducated females in regions with higher HIV rates. I
use exogenous geographic variation in HIV rates to identify the causal effect of HIV on
female marriage. The risk of HIV infection causes marriage rates to fall for educated
females but rise for uneducated females. One explanation is that in high HIV regions:
(1) educated females take the time to find a partner who will use condoms and get HIV
tested, which delays marriage, and (2) uneducated females marry sooner because youth
and virginity are prized by males, and employment opportunities are scarce. These
findings imply that returns to education for young females are likely underestimated
since they miss conceivably substantial health-related benefits.
Is widow remarriage beneficial to child school enrollment? Women are widowed at
relatively young ages in high-HIV areas of Sub Saharan Africa and are likely to have
school-aged children. A main finding in the parental death literature is that the death
of a mother hurts child education more so than does the death of a father. This masks
important differences in child school enrollment across households who have experienced
a father’s death. This paper estimates the effect of widow remarriage on child school
enrollment by exploiting regional variation in HIV, religion, and the sex ratio. The cross-
country empirical results indicate that remarriage is detrimental to child enrollment
for widows with less than six years of schooling, yet beneficial to child enrollment for
widows with six or more years of schooling. This is consistent with (1) marital sorting by
education (correlation=.7), (2) intra-household bargaining, and (3) differences in tastes
for remarriage and schooling. A policy implication is that investing in female education
in high-HIV areas – among those likely to become widows – can have multiplier effects, as
there is complementarity between the returns to education on marriage market outcomes
and children’s education.
Acknowledgements
I am forever grateful to my advisors Peter Gottschalk, Andrew Beauchamp, and
Donald Cox for their support and guidance throughout the doctoral process. I thank
Shannon Seitz and Avraham Ebenstein for their mentorship at different points in my dis-
sertation, Mathis Wagner for his help with my theoretical model and figures, Christopher
Baum for his confidence in me and recommending me for all things Stata, and Meghan
Skira for outstanding editing. I also thank my fellow classmates at Boston College, all
of my friends, especially Meghan and Caron, participants at the NEUDC conference
at MIT, Center for the Study of African Economies conference at Oxford University
and the African Studies Center Graduate Student Conference at Boston University for
helpful discussions, as well as my host family in Kisumu, Kenya, co-workers at the HIV
Testing and Treatment Center at Nyanza Hospital, and my fellow volunteers and friends,
Shelly and Lilly.
A special thanks to my boyfriend, Ryan Desrosiers, whose love and support allowed
me to succeed even when it was hardest to do so, and to my family who has always
believed in me: my mom, dad, brothers, Kevin and Andy, sister and roommate, Kimmy
– what a ride it has been these past couple of years, sister, Katie, sister-in-law, Katie,
and to Joann and Tony, and my niece and nephew, Sienna and Max.
Contents
1 The Effect of HIV on Marriage in Zambia 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Value Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Data & Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.1 Basic Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.2 Sources of Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.3 Instruments for HIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.4 First-Stage Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.1 OLS and IV Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.2 Hazard Estimates, by Female HIV Status and Education . . . . 22
1.5.3 Grouped Logit Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
i
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.8.1 Solving for Reservation Partner Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.8.2 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2 The Effect of Widow Remarriage on Child School Enrollment 58
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Data & Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.3.1 Validity of Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
ii
Chapter 1
The Effect of HIV on Marriage in
Zambia
1.1 Introduction
Can considerable variation in HIV rates across Zambia explain observed marriage
rate differences between educated and uneducated females? I provide evidence of a
previously undocumented marriage gap between uneducated and educated 20-24 year-
old females that is increasing in the risk of HIV infection (Figure 1).1 This disparity is
common across countries in East and Southern Africa where over 10% of the population
is infected with HIV.2 Precisely because there have been nearly one million AIDS deaths
in Zambia since the HIV epidemic hit in 1984, it is important that assessments of
behavioral response to HIV (1) identify groups that are changing their behavior and (2)
account for the principal routes of HIV infection. Uncovering reasons why this marriage
gap exists where HIV rates are high can provide insight into the consequences of the
1Importantly, this increasing marriage gap holds when excluding females enrolled in school. The
marriage gap is positive but flatter for 25-29 year-old females (Figure 2).
2(Figures 3-4). I study Zambia for its high HIV rates and rich spatial variation in HIV.
1
risk of exposure to HIV on social structure and the incentives to marry. It also sheds
light on the timing of marriage as being responsive to HIV risk where changes in sexual
behavior have failed to be and leads to a policy recommendation that is practical and
intuitively appealing.
Specifically, a large literature has focused on the responsiveness of sexual behavior
to the risk of HIV infection. Most studies find that individuals, on average, do not
react to the risk of HIV infection [3], [6], [18], [19], [21], [32], [34], [35]. They do not
use condoms more frequently, nor do they reduce their number of concurrent sexual
partners. Groups that are responsive to a higher risk of HIV infection are those with a
longer life expectancy, more wealth, or more education [11], [12], [23].
The literature also aims to account for the principal routes of HIV infection, with
four main hypotheses attempting to explain high rates of HIV in the face of low rates
of HIV transmission: marriage (unfaithful husbands infect their wives) [25], spousal
search [20], heterogeneity in risk preferences [24], [29], and dense sexual networks [28].
Magruder (2008) shows that a death profile that is decreasing in age between ages 30
and 50 is common in countries with high HIV rates and consistent with a declining
HIV risk after age 30.3 He contends that a declining HIV risk after age 30 is generated
when most people are infected with HIV through spousal search, given that the average
lifecycle leads from spousal search into marriage. His literature review suggests that
an HIV risk that is increasing in age beyond age 30 is generated when most people are
infected with HIV during marriage.4
3Magruder infers the age-profile of HIV infection risk from the age-profile of deaths in South Africa,
1996-2002 (Figure 5). The risk of HIV infection is independent of age in models where heterogeneity in
risk preferences or dense sexual networks are used to explain high HIV with low transmission rates.
4Magruder uses a search and matching model of serial monogamy in which there is heterogeneity in
HIV transmission probability. Individuals randomly match with a partner who is uninfected (no risk),
2
This paper adds to the literature in three ways: (1) I document that (a) educated
females are less likely to marry (i) in high-HIV than low-HIV regions and (ii) than
uneducated females in high-HIV regions, and (b) uneducated females are more likely to
marry in high-HIV than low-HIV regions; (2) I am the first to analyze the effect of the
risk of HIV infection on female marriage rates, by education status; and (3) I formulate a
model of spousal search that takes HIV risk into account and has a testable implication.
I find a causal relationship between HIV and marriage. I present estimates taking
into account the potential endogeneity of HIV with respect to marriage by using an
instrumental variables strategy. A 10 percentage point increase in HIV rates causes a 10
percentage point drop in marriage rates of educated females and a 12 percentage point
rise in marriage rates of uneducated females. These results are statistically significant
at the 5% level, controlling for employment rates for males and females, male education
rates, an urban binary, and female access to information.
The findings are consistent with a model in which HIV causes a divergence in mar-
riage rates between educated and uneducated females due to differences in their financial
abiliy to stay single and in their bargaining power to stay protected from HIV when sin-
gle. Both types of females want to marry someone of the same HIV status as themselves
(uninfected match with uninfected; infected match with infected), so that they do not
get infected by their partner (uninfected match with infected), or infect their partner
just-infected (highly infectious), or infected and in their latent state (low infectiousness). Magruder’s
spousal search model is able to simulate an HIV epidemic with low HIV transmission rates, given entry
of a mere 1-3% of infected people into spousal search. When individuals have clusters of very short
relationships that they easily reject in between a few longer ones, HIV is highly transmissible, given that
unprotected sex occurs. Upon entering a new relationship, individuals are likely to have just left a very
short relationship in which they are infected, remain highly infectious for up to three months and likely
infect their new partner.
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(infected match with uninfected). However, since partner HIV status is unobservable,
there is a time cost to uncovering it. Educated females can afford to stay single and, in
high-HIV areas where there is emphasis on condom use, take the time to find a partner
who will use condoms and get HIV-tested with her, only marrying if they match on HIV
status, which delays marriage. Uneducated females marry sooner in high-HIV areas
because of higher demand for their youth and virginity – the absence of HIV risk – and,
because they cannot get their partners to use condoms when single, they choose their
second best option of minimizing their number of sexual partners, and marry.5
Perhaps the paper’s main contribution is highlighting that the optimal timing of
marriage – in terms of minimizing lifetime HIV risk – may differ by education. I establish
that spousal search is an optimal response to the risk of HIV infection until the mid-20s
for females who can enforce condom use when single and that marriage is an optimal
response at around age 20 for females who cannot enforce condom use when single; this
is shown by stratifying the female age-profile of HIV risk by education and age at first
marriage. My results, by education, reconcile two findings from the literature: (1) early
marriage is an HIV risk factor for sexually active teenagers [7] and (2) late marriage is
an HIV risk factor for sexually active females[4]. That is, early marriage is a risk factor
for educated females who benefit from delaying marriage by using their leverage when
single to ensure positive assortative matching on HIV status, and late marriage is a risk
factor for uneducated females who do not have this same leverage over condom use and
are more likely to become HIV-infected by staying single.
5Sexually active females have no way to protect themselves from HIV aside from their partner wearing
a condom. This highlights the importance of controlled trials finding that a vaginal microbicidal gel
reduces female HIV risk by 50%, as it can be used by females without male consent. Hence, only
uninfected single females who can persuade their partner to use condoms can be selective during spousal
search.
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Further implications of my findings include non-pecuniary benefits to education.
The results imply that females might benefit a lot from education, over and above
earnings differences. The conventional wisdom is that HIV lessens the incentives to get
an education because life expectancy shrinks. But the implications here are the opposite,
since being better educated can have significant health benefits. An educated female
who can safeguard herself from HIV while single has better control over her lifetime HIV
risk, and a potentially higher life expectancy. Thus, pecuniary returns to the education
of females likely underestimate the actual rates of return since they miss conceivably
substantial health-related benefits.
In the remainder of this paper, I present the theoretical framework, describe the data
and descriptive statistics, and discuss the estimation and instrumenting strategy before
presenting the estimated impact of HIV on marriage, interpreting and concluding.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
I present a theoretical framework that is consistent with a stylized fact: a gap in
marriage rates exists between uneducated and educated females in Zambia in 2007 that
is considerably larger where HIV rates are high and almost nonexistent where HIV rates
are low (Figure 1).6
The model is based on McCall’s (1970) model of intertemporal job search [26] [27].
Consider a single individual who is searching for a spouse. Each period, the individual
draws one marriage offer x from a distribution of partner quality, F(X)=Prob(x ≤ X).
6I plot the difference in marriage rates between 20-24 year-old uneducated and educated females
against male HIV rates, along with the 95% confidence interval. Each observation is an average at the
region-rural level in Zambia 2007. Marriage rates are nearly always higher for uneducated than educated
females.
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An individual has the option of rejecting the offer, in which case she receives utility
Vt = V0 this period by staying single and waits until next period to draw another offer
from F. Alternately, she can accept the marriage offer and receive utility Vt = x, in
which case she receives a utility of x per period forever after. Divorce and recall are not
permitted. The single individual maximizes E
∑
βtVt, where 0 < β < 1 is a discount
factor.
Let Π be the probability an individual is matched with an HIV-infected partner and
P the probability of HIV infection per match with an infected partner.7 This implies
that each marriage offer drawn carries a risk of HIV infection, ΠP , including offers that
are rejected. A single individual who has just drawn a marriage offer is simultaneously
exposed to an HIV risk and observes both partner quality and her partner’s HIV status
before deciding to accept or reject the offer. There are uninfected and infected individuals
in spousal search each period. Given an individual’s own HIV status, HIVi, and partner
HIV status, HIVj , an individual will accept a match if x ≥ xHIVi(HIVj), where x
HIVi
(HIVj)
is the
reservation value of partner quality.
I make the following assumptions. Because educated females are in relationships
that are more likely to use condoms than are uneducated females, I assume that the
probability of HIV infection per match with an infected partner, P, differs by education.
That is, the probability of HIV infection is greater for uneducated than educated females
( ∂P∂Educ < 0). Also, the value of staying single, V0, is increasing in education (
∂V0
∂Educ >
0). An HIV-infected individual receives disutility, V , from transmitting HIV to an
uninfected individual and an uninfected individual receives disutility, D, from being
infected by their partner. λ is the match offer rate.
Let v(xj , HIVj |HIVi) be the expected value of
∑
βtVt for a single individual with
7Π is the HIV rate and P is the HIV transmission rate.
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HIV status HIVi who has offer xj in hand from a partner with HIV status HIVj , and
is deciding whether to accept or reject the offer, while behaving optimally.
1.2.1 Value Functions
The value function for an uninfected single individual i who draws a marriage offer
with an uninfected partner j, v(xj , HIV −j |HIV −i ), with xHIVi(j) , satisfies the Bellman
equation:
v(xj , HIV −j |HIV −i ) = max{
xHIV
−
(−)
1− β , V0 + β[(1−Π)
∫
v(xHIV
−
(−) |HIV −i )dF (x′)+ (1.1)
Π(1− P )
∫
v(xHIV
−
(+) |HIV −i )dF (x′) + ΠP
∫
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +i )−D)dF (x′)]}
where maximization is over two actions: (1) accept the marriage offer and stay married
forever at utility xHIV
−
(−) or (2) reject the offer, receive V0 this period, and draw a new
marriage offer x′ from distribution F next period. With her current draw, she faces
no risk of HIV infection. If she rejects the offer, her draw next period comes with the
probability ΠP of matching with an infected partner, being infected by him and receiving
disutility D, or the probability Π(1− P ) of not being infected by him. The chance that
next period she draws an uninfected partner is (1−Π)(1− P ) = (1−Π), as there is no
transmission risk when an uninfected individual is matched with an uninfected partner,
(1−Π)P =0.
Similarly, I describe the three other match type possibilities (infected draws unin-
fected partner, infected draws infected partner, uninfected draws infected partner); see
appendix for solutions. Consider the value function for an infected single individual who
draws a marriage offer with an uninfected partner, v(xj , HIV −j |HIV +i ). This infected
individual in a discordant current match faces a risk P of infecting her partner and
receiving disutility V . If she rejects, she either meets another uninfected partner next
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period with probability (1 − Π) and faces the same risk of infecting him, or meets an
HIV-positive partner with probability Π, and marries with no utility loss.
Consider an infected individual who draws a match with a concordant infected part-
ner. If she rejects the offer, with probability Π she is again matched with an infected
partner, but with probability (1 − Π)P draws an uninfected partner, infects him, and
receives disutility V , and with probability (1− Π)(1− P ) draws an uninfected partner
and does not infect him.
Lastly, consider an uninfected individual who is currently matched with an infected
partner. Recall that an individual can be infected by a match even if she rejects the
match. With probability P she is infected at the time of the draw and receives disutility
D. If she then rejects, next period she faces the chance P (1− Π)(1− P ) of drawing an
uninfected partner but not infecting him, the chance P (1 − Π)P of infecting him and
receiving disutility V , or of drawing an infected partner with probability PΠ. With
probability (1-P) in her current draw, she is not infected. If she rejects, she meets a
similarly uninfected partner next period with probability (1 − P )(1 − Π), an infected
partner who she does not infect with probability (1−P )Π(1−P ), or who she does infect
with probability (1− P )ΠP and receives disutility D.
For each case, the average waiting time until receiving a successful marriage offer is
N = 1P (x≥x) =
1
ex
, as the solution to the dynamic programming problem is a constant
reservation value and hence a constant hazard rate.8 As N is an increasing function of
x, an increase in the reservation value of partner quality is equivalent to an increase in
the time until marriage.
From this, one can perform comparative statics of interest for each of the possible
8A constant hazard rate means that the probability of marriage next period does not depend on the
length of time spent unmarried.
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matches: (1) the effect of a change in HIV rates on the waiting time until marriage,
and (2) the mediating effect of education on the relationship between HIV and marriage
through (a) protection against HIV (using condoms), P, and (b) the outside option, V0.
1.2.2 Comparative Statics
For an uninfected individual matched with an uninfected partner, the equation that
characterizes the determination of the reservation value of partner quality (see appendix)
is:9:
xHIV
−
(−) − V0 =
β
1− β [(
1
λ
−ΠPD)e−λxHIV
−
(−) ]
I define the right side of the above equation as h(xHIV
−
(−) ) =
β
1−β [(
1
λ −ΠPD)e
−λxHIV−
(−) ].
For an uninfected individual matched with an uninfected partner, (1) an increase in
HIV rates is predicted to increase marriage rates, on average. That is, an increase in
HIV rates reduces the value of continued search, the reservation value of partner quality
(
∂h(xHIV
−
(−) )
∂Π < 0), and the waiting time to marriage. Put simply, as HIV increases, an
uninfected individual is luckier to be matched with an uninfected partner and so marries
more quickly (Figure A.1).
For the uninfected, as HIV rates increase, (2a) marriage rates are predicted to in-
crease for the uneducated relative to the educated. As the probability of meeting an
infected partner increases, uninfected individuals with a higher infection risk (by assump-
tion, the uneducated) are more likely to accept their current draw (∂(
∂h(xHIV
−
(−) )
∂Π
)
∂P < 0).
If they reject, it is likely they will be infected by and receive disutility from an infected
9The left side is the cost of searching one more period when an offer xHIV
−
(−) is in hand. The right side
is the expected benefit of searching one more period in terms of the expected present value associated
with drawing x′ > xHIV
−
(−) . This equation instructs the uninfected agent to set x
HIV−
(−) so that the cost
of searching one more time equals the benefit.
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draw next period. Thus, those who face a higher HIV infection risk, as HIV rises, lower
their reservation value of partner quality and marry sooner.
For the uninfected, as the option value V0 of staying single increases, (2b) mar-
riage rates are predicted to fall, independent of HIV rates. That is, as the outside
option increases, the cost of searching decreases, and the partner quality one needs to
be matched with to accept an offer increases (
∂xHIV
−
(−) −V0
∂V0
<0). A higher option value,
then, increases the waiting time to marriage. The comparative statics for the remaining
match possibilities are shown in the appendix.
Figure A.2 presents numerical solutions of the average waiting time to marriage for
uninfected educated and uneducated females matched with uninfected partners. By
assumption, only the outside option, V0, and ability to reduce the risk of infection, P,
differ by education as channels through which HIV affects marriage. I parameterize
values P = .25, V0 = 4 for educated females and P = .5, V0 = 2 for uneducated females
and plot N–the average waiting time to marriage–against male HIV rates, Π. I also set
β = .95, D = 2, V = 2, and λ = 1. Figure A.2 depicts the ability of the theoretical
model to mimic a female marriage gap, by education, that is increasing in HIV rates.
See Figure A.3-A.5 for numerical solutions to other match combinations.
This framework formalizes the intuition set forth in the introduction: educated fe-
males in high HIV regions are expected to delay marriage due to a high outside option
and a better ability to protect themselves from HIV when single. The expectation is
that uneducated females in high HIV regions marry sooner because of their low outside
option and lack of bargaining power to enforce condom use when single.
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1.3 Data & Descriptive Statistics
1.3.1 Data
I use the Zambia 2007 cross-section of Demographic & Health Surveys (DHS) data.
The data are repeated cross-sections of nationally representative samples of households
in a number of countries in Africa, collected at roughly five-year intervals. All women
aged 15-49 and men aged 15-59 are eligible for the survey. The most recent cross-
section(s) includes HIV test results, for which all households were eligible. Blood samples
were taken by finger prick for all respondents who consented to HIV testing.
The appeal of the DHS data is that the HIV test results can be merged with the
demographic data. This data is a significant improvement over HIV data used previ-
ously. In the past, researchers have used national HIV estimates that are representative
of the population, as respondents were pregnant women, intravenous drug users, and
commercial sex workers. Most empirical HIV research has been cross-country analysis,
making it difficult to argue that all else is constant across countries. I use demographic
and HIV data for one country and one year, exploiting geographic variation in HIV and
marriage rates, which requires weaker assumptions.
Due to the inability of an econometrician to pinpoint the marriage market within
which each female and male searches, one must make geographic assumptions. I assume
that the geographic boundaries of each sub-marriage market in Zambia are the rural
and urban part of each administrative region, for a total of eighteen region-rural sub-
marriage markets. Surely, smaller marriage markets exist within each region-rural sub-
marriage market, given that Zambia is home to seventy tribes.10 One or two large tribes
10The smallest DHS-defined geographic region is a cluster, defined as urban or rural, where rural
denotes a village and urban can be either a city or town. There are 320 DHS clusters in Zambia.
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and several smaller tribes reside in each sub-marriage market, across which inter-tribal
marriage occurs. What is important for identification of the effect of HIV on marriage
is that the spatial variation of male HIV rates across region-rural areas, not within a
region-rural area, induces differences in marriage rates across marriage markets.
The geographic definition of a marriage market is more palatable if there is limited
in- and out-migration. Data on spousal origins suggest that females are more likely to
have migrated if they are married, and males are less likely to have migrated if they are
married, consistent with patrilocal migration of females to the male’s home upon their
marriage.11 Females who recently migrated are more likely to have recently married.
This is consistent with married females migrating only to move to their husband’s home,
and of single males migrating for work. As long as the expected distribution of male
HIV rates from which females sample during spousal search is updated by females as
males migrate, then female marriage behavior will be responsive to contemporaneous
male HIV rates.
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Overall response rates for the Zambia 2007
sample are 98% for the demographic survey and 75% for the HIV testing. [20] There
are 13,646 15-59 year-old males and females in the Zambia 2007 sample, of which 7,146
are 15-49 year-old females. Zambia is the most highly urbanized country in Africa, with
44% of 15-59 year-olds living in urban areas. For males only, 79.3% consented to HIV
testing. Table 2 presents observable characteristics of males who did and did not consent
to HIV testing. Males who consented to HIV testing were older and more likely to live
in a rural area.
11The majority of tribes in Zambia are patrilineal and practice patrilocal migration, with the exception
of the Bemba, who are matrilineal and practice the reverse migration of males to the female’s home;
they are concentrated in Copperbelt, the most highly urbanized region.
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The main variables used in the analysis are an indicator for educated, female marriage
rates and male HIV rates. I consider an individual educated if they have completed seven
or more years of education (completed primary school) or are still enrolled in school. I
chose 7 years of education as the cut-off as it is the mode, mean, and median for the
sample of 20-24 year-old females. Of the 1,405 20-24 year-old females that I focus on
in this analysis, 9% have no education, 48% have completed primary school, 38% have
completed secondary school, and 5% have completed some higher schooling.
I calculate marriage, education, and employment rates as averages at the region-rural
level, weighted with individual sampling weights to obtain nationally-representative sam-
ples. I consider a female married if she self-reports as (1) married or (2) currently living
with a partner (commonly accepted as married in the literature). Male HIV rates are the
percent of males who are HIV-positive in a region-rural area, weighted by HIV sampling
weights.12 Employment rate is the percent currently working, and male education rate
the percent who completed at least a primary school education, both in a region-rural
area.
12DHS surveys collect data from nationally-representative probability samples, often over-sampling
certain categories of respondents. Because the samples are not self-weighting and because response rates
vary across sampling domains, weights are used to obtain nationally-representative estimates. Beyond
the standard weighting, to deal with variations in non-response rates for HIV testing the DHS generates
a separate weight for the sample of respondents who participate in HIV testing. These weights are
constructed separately for men and women and are adjusted for non-response by sampling strata to
develop nationally-representative HIV prevalence estimates that attempt to account for non-response
on HIV testing.[30]
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1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 3 and 4 present evidence that educated females are better able to protect
themselves from HIV while single. These tables display descriptive statistics on the
sexual behavior of 20-24 year-old females in regions with a high and low risk of HIV
infection, by education and marital status. I consider a geographic cluster to be in a
high-HIV region if its average male HIV rates are above the median region-rural HIV
rate, 12%.13
Table 3a displays the percent of 20-24 year-old females who used condoms during
their last sexual intercourse, and Table 3b the sensitivity of condom use at last sex to
age-group specification. In both high- and low-HIV regions, single educated females are
roughly 20 percentage points more likely than single uneducated females to use condoms
with their last sexual partner (55% vs. 35% in high-HIV regions; 30% vs. 15% in low-
HIV regions). Both educated and uneducated females are more likely to use condoms
at last sex in high HIV regions than low HIV regions, again by roughly 20 percentage
points. Interestingly, when married there is no difference in condom use by education
or HIV region, since condoms are rarely used in marriage.
Table 4 presents sexual behavior statistics for 20-24 year-old females: the percent
who have never had sex, the number of lifetime sexual partners, and the percent ever
tested for HIV, by education, marital status, and HIV region. The table shows that (1)
when at high risk of HIV infection, single educated females are more likely be virgins
than single uneducated females (32% vs. 14%) and (2) by the time they marry, educated
females are more likely to have been tested for HIV than uneducated females – when
married and HIV rates are high (79% vs. 49%) or low (46% and 28%). Lastly, (3) single
1353% of the sample lives in high-HIV regions, with region x rural HIV rates between 12 and 21.5%;
47% live in low-HIV regions, with HIV rates between 3 and 11.8%
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educated females have had fewer sexual partners than single uneducated females. This
is consistent with a search model in which educated females are more selective.14,15
Consider the population of married couples by whether each spouse has ever been
HIV tested and by own and partner HIV status. Presumably, couples who recently
married are more likely to have chosen their spouse based on his/her HIV status than
to have affected their partner’s HIV status within that time. Just-married couples’ HIV
statuses should therefore be more indicative of partner choice (ex ante HIV status) and
10-20 year marriages more indicative of an outcome (ex post concordant HIV status).
Of marriages formed in the last year, educated-female marriages are more likely to
exhibit positive assortative matching on HIV status than are uneducated-female mar-
riages, conditional on both members of the couple having been HIV tested. As the time
since marriage increases, a couple is increasingly likely to become concordant (same HIV
status).16
Figure 6 presents descriptive evidence that is consistent with educated females de-
laying marriage when at a high relative to low risk of HIV infection. I plot the percent
14That single educated females are not more likely to get HIV tested than single uneducated females
could be due to higher rates of out-of-wedlock pregnancy among the uneducated than educated. A
pregnant woman who visits a prenatal clinic in Zambia is strongly encouraged to get tested for HIV.
If a pregnant infected woman is put on HIV drugs (ARVs), mother-to-child HIV transmission can be
prevented in all but 5% of cases. (cite) Also, because HIV is primarily transmitted through heterosexual
sex, HIV testing may seem less necessary for the 32% of single educated females who are sexually inactive
and feel certain of their HIV status.
15As motivation for theoretical simulations, of educated single females in high-HIV regions, 70% can
be considered protected from HIV: 32% are sexually inactive and 55% of sexually active use condoms; .32
+ .68*.55 ≈ 70%. Of uneducated single females in high-HIV regions, 50% can be considered protected
from HIV: 14% are sexually inactive and 44% of sexually active use condoms; .14 + .86*.44 ≈ 50%.
16While no information is available on the timing of HIV infection, the time since marriage can be
calculated from current age and age at first marriage.
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of educated females who are married on the y-axis against female age on the x-axis, for
regions with male HIV rates higher than the median (bottom dotted line) and lower
than the median (solid line above). I document that (1) marriage rates of 20-24 year-old
educated females are lower in high HIV than low HIV regions and that (2) there is no
difference in marriage rates of educated females before age 18 or by age 26.
A female marriage gap, then, exists for those in the 20-24 year-old age range and is
at least partially driven by educated females in high HIV regions having lower marriage
rates than educated females in low HIV regions. That is, educated females enter the
marriage market once they finish school at roughly 18 in both high and low HIV regions,
after which marriage rates by HIV region diverge through age 24, then converge by
age 26. Crucially, under the assumption that females within education groups behave
similarly to those just older than themselves, the figure suggests that the educated at
high risk of infection delay marriage rather than decide to never marry.
1.4 Estimation
1.4.1 Basic Specification
I estimate the impact of male HIV rates on female marriage rates, controlling for
factors that affect the attractiveness of males and the propensity of females to marry:
Mfir = α0 + α1HIV
m
r +X
′α+ 1
where Mfir is the female marriage rate of age group i in region-rural area r, HIV
m
r is the
male HIV rate in region-rural r, and X is a set of control variables for the region-rural
average desirability of males as husbands (male education rate, male employment rate),
an urban binary, and female opportunities (female employment rate, female information
sources (tv, newspaper, radio)).
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1.4.2 Sources of Bias
Male HIV is potentially endogenous in the OLS marriage rate regressions, due to (1)
reverse causality, (2) omitted variable bias, and/or biased due to (3) measurement error
in HIV.
Reverse Causation
In addition to HIV affecting marriage, the decision to marry or not may affect the
female risk of infection. The literature review pointed out that spousal search and
marriage are two of the principal routes of HIV infection. An issue in region-level
regressions is that HIV might be high precisely because marriage rates are low to begin
with (e.g. skewed sex ratios). Reverse causation can cause inconsistent estimates, but
can be corrected for by instrumental variables.
Omitted Variable Bias
If relevant determinants of the propensity to marry are omitted that are correlated
with HIV rates, then the HIV point estimate will be biased. Potential omitted relevant
variables include (1) economic development/poverty, (2) tribal customs/traditions, and
(3) female migration status.
The lack of economic development in a region-rural area incentivizes marriage for
women (insurance mechanism, joint resources) and could isolate an area from the spread
of HIV if highways are absent; trucking routes have high HIV rates due to the demand
for commercial sex by truck drivers.
Tribal custom may dictate both that marriage is universal and that multiple sexual
partners are acceptable, which perpetuates the epidemic. Or, if females marry young in
certain tribes, this may protect against HIV risk.
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If females migrate to gain access to better marriage or employment prospects, then
even if this changes the composition of the urban population, controlling for character-
istics of educated female types who migrate will reduce the bias on urban. I control for
female access to information as a proxy for the types of (educated) females that migrate
to urban areas.
Measurement Error in HIV
Measurement error in HIV data does not seem to be an issue, as HIV testing was
conducted and recorded by DHS, not self-reported, and HIV weights are used to make
HIV test results nationally-representative. However, if measurement error exists, instru-
menting for HIV corrects for it.
1.4.3 Instruments for HIV
Variation in HIV rates across region-rural areas in Zambia are correlated with dis-
tance to the origin of the HIV epidemic [22] and male circumcision rates. Male circum-
cision is protective against HIV, cutting the male HIV risk in half.17 I exploit variation
in the tribal custom of circumcision to explain variation in male HIV rates across local
marriage markets. Christianity is practiced by 99% of Zambians, so it is not religion,
17Randomized controlled trials of male circumcision were completed in 2007 in Uganda and Kenya. [3]
The study found that male circumcision reduces the risk of HIV infection in males by removing high-risk
cells in the foreskin, which makes the cells under the foreskin less sensitive and less prone to bleeding.
With the finding that male circumcision is medically protective against HIV risk, the Population Council
began designing a roll-out of medical circumcision of males after 2007. As of 2010, there have been no
men medically circumcised in Zambia, according to the Population Council, which reduces concerns of
any medical circumcision information campaigns occurring by the time of the interview in 2007, as well
as females knowing that males who are circumcised are at lower HIV risk; they should be no more likely
to search for a circumcised male in the marriage market.
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but tribal custom, that dictates whether males are circumcised. Circumcision rates are
quite high in the western part of Zambia – in Western and Northwestern provinces (36%
and 70%, respectively) – and quite low elsewhere (less than 15%). Male HIV rates are
relatively low in these regions (15% and 7%, respectively).
Distance from the origin of the HIV epidemic is correlated with male HIV rates. The
origin of the epidemic is in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), at the geographic
center of the country, (-6.31, 23.59), rather than at a political or urban center; the first
human HIV cases were located on both sides of the country. The closer a region is to the
origin of the epidemic in the DRC, the higher is the expected HIV rate, as HIV travels
through sexual networks. The DRC borders Zambia to the north. Southern Africa was
hit first and is still the hardest by HIV, next closest and hardest hit is East Africa, and
furthest away and hit least is West Africa.
GPS coordinates for DHS data are available for each of 320 clusters in the sample.
For each DHS cluster, a single GPS coordinate is available, defined as the geographic
center of the cluster. I calculate the distance, in kilometers, from each DHS cluster in
Zambia to the origin of the HIV epidemic in the DRC, and take the average of all cluster-
origin distances within each region-rural area; log distance best fits the relationship with
male HIV rates.18
I control for latitude to ensure the relationship between distance from the origin
of the epidemic and HIV is not driven by geographical location. I do not control for
longitude, as it is not significantly related to male HIV rates, and only reduces my
degrees of freedom.
18There are 320 clusters and 18 region-rural areas; each cluster is in only one region-rural areas.
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1.4.4 First-Stage Results
Due to the potential endogeneity of male HIV rates, I instrument for HIV with
male circumcision rates, distance from the origin of the HIV epidemic, and latitude,
all averaged at the region-rural level. In the first-stage regression results in Appendix
Table A.1, male circumcision is protective against HIV. The further a region is from the
origin of the epidemic, the longer it takes HIV to spread through sexual networks, and
the lower the male HIV rates. Latitude has a small negative, but significant effect on
male HIV. The first-stage regressors explain over 90% of the variation in HIV rates.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 OLS and IV Results
Table 5 presents OLS and instrumental variables estimates, which are entirely con-
sistent with one another. I show both to ensure that the results are not driven by my
choice of instruments. Each column is a separate regression for educated or uneducated
females, with the OLS estimates in Panel A and the IV estimates in Panel B. Overall, a
10 percentage point increase in male HIV rates causes a 12 percentage point rise in une-
ducated female marriage rates, ceteris paribus, as well as a 10 percentage point drop in
educated female marriage rates. The unconditional OLS estimates are downward-biased
compared to column (2) with urban included, due to a strong positive correlation be-
tween HIV and urban residence and a negative association between marriage and urban
residence.
Column (3) adds the male employment rate, which is positively associated with
marriage for both types of females; employed males are more desirable to women, and a
wife and wedding more affordable to men who have jobs. Column (3) also adds the male
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education rate. The coefficients on male education are indicative of positive assortative
matching on education. The higher the percent of educated males, the harder time
uneducated females have finding a spouse and the easier time educated females have
finding a spouse.
Column (4) holds female employment opportunities constant. The HIV point esti-
mate in the IV regression reflects a negative and significant causal impact of the risk of
HIV infection on the propensity of educated females to marry. Educated females have
employment opportunities that may allow them to delay marriage in search of a better
matched spouse.
Column (5) includes frequency of access to three sources of information: TV, the
radio, and the news. The bias on column (5) OLS urban and HIV estimates is reduced
by controlling for female types that may be more likely to migrate to urban areas with
lower HIV rates. A majority of the variation in marriage is explained by the independent
variables.
Columns (3) and (4) pass all identification tests, which leads me to my preferred
specification of the IV estimates in column (4), which control for female employment.
For the underidentification and weak identification tests, I reject the null (preferred; null
hypothesis: underidentification; excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endoge-
nous regressors, respectively) in columns (3)-(5) where male education and employment
are controlled for. For the overidentification test, I fail to reject the null (preferred; null
hypothesis: instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term) in regressions
(1)-(4) without female access to information.
In pooled OLS regressions (not shown), I combine educated and uneducated females,
and test for equality of the educated and uneducated female parameters. As expected, I
find a significant difference in the effect of the risk of HIV infection on female marriage
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between educated and uneducated females. I perform a Chow test for equality of the
intercept and slopes, by education, and reject the null hypothesis that the educated and
uneducated female marriage equations should be identically specified.
I perform sensitivity tests (not shown) on OLS regressions, by varying the age group
and definition of the educated binary. Sequentially adding a year at a time, the results
are robust with significance for 20-25 year-old females, and robust, just with the loss
of significance, for 18-26 year-olds. Results do not hold for ages 17 and below or ages
27 and above; above age 27, widowhood becomes a factor. The results are also robust
to varying the criteria for educated from ‘currently enrolled in school or 7 years of
education’ to ‘currently enrolled in school and varying years of education to between 6
and 12.’19
1.5.2 Hazard Estimates, by Female HIV Status and Education
In Table 6, I test the theoretical predictions over search behavior, by HIV infection
status of educated and uneducated females. The model predicts that (1) educated
females delay marriage relative to uneducated females, and that the marriage gap is (2)
increasing in HIV rates among the uninfected and (3) decreasing in HIV rates among
the infected.20 That is, the uneducated-educated marriage gap is closing for infected
19The HIV point estimates get stronger for educated females by increasing the number of years of
education, sequentially, from 7 to 12 (stricter cut-off) and weaker for uneducated females. Vice versa,
the HIV point estimate gets stronger for uneducated females by lowering the cut-off number of years
of education from 7 to 6. Finally, the results are robust to varying the criteria for the educated binary
from ‘currently enrolled in school or 7 years of education’ to simply ‘7 years of education’.
20Model prediction (1) is driven by assuming a higher outside option for educated females, and (2)
and (3) are driven by the lower HIV transmission probability for educated than uneducated females.
Crucially, I assume an altruistic disutility is received by an infected individual who infects an uninfected
partner. Where HIV rates are high, an infected individual who is matched with an infected partner
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females as HIV rates rise, as it is easier for both to assortatively match on HIV status.21
Also, the marriage gap is increasing for uninfected females as HIV rates rise, as it is
harder to match on unobservable partner HIV status.
Table 6 displays Weibull hazard rate regressions of female time to marriage, with the
effect of HIV rates on the hazard varying by female education and female HIV status.22
The results appear to confirm the selective search process of 20-24 year-old educated
uninfected females. The higher are HIV rates, the less likely they are to marry in the
next year, conditional on having been unmarried up until that point. All other types of
females – all uneducated and the infected educated – who have been single up until that
point, have a higher probability of marrying in the next year, the higher are HIV rates.
The hazard estimates highlight that high HIV rates are conducive to matching for
knows there are potentially higher quality infected partners that she may draw next period if she rejects
the current partner. Because of the disutility from infecting an uninfected draw, an educated female is
more likely to reject in search of a better quality infected match than is an uneducated female, as the
educated are more likely to use condoms and less likely to infect an uninfected draw. An infected female,
then, is likely to wait longer to marry – the higher are HIV rates – if she is educated than uneducated.
21The focus group of HIV-infected college-age men and women I conducted in Kisumu, Kenya in
August 2010 made clear the notion that infected individuals, with 30 years of lifespan remaining, wish
to marry just as uninfected individuals do. The only difference is that they would like to match with an
infected partner.
22Let duration be the length of time, in years, until an individual is married; i.e. their age at first
marriage. Although the duration is rounded to the nearest year, I treat duration as a continuous variable
with an Weibull distribution. The data are flow data on a random sample surveyed between April and
October 2007. The data are retrospective in that individuals reported their age at first marriage and
their current marital status. Because of the different dates of birth but same survey year, the entry into
observation differs while the censoring time is the same. The duration of time until marriage varies from
20-24 years. Due to the right-censoring of the flow data (not all females are married in the sample), I
make the assumption that the actual (unobserved) duration of time to marriage is the minimum of the
observed duration and the censoring time.
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infected females, even educated infected females. High HIV rates increase the hazard for
uninfected uneducated females. That is, uninfected uneducated females marry sooner
in high-HIV than low-HIV areas. This is consistent with the statistic that uneducated-
female couples are more likely to have the same HIV status without HIV testing than
are educated-female couples; i.e. older, uninfected males have targeted these no-risk
females before their sexual debut in high-HIV areas. Uninfected educated females delay
marriage in high-HIV relative to low-HIV areas to selectively search for a partner who
will use condoms and get HIV tested, so that they may positively assortatively match
as well. The estimate of p of roughly 6.5 indicates positive duration dependence: for a
particular unmarried person, the rate of marriage increases with age.
1.5.3 Grouped Logit Results
Table 7 presents grouped logit marginal effects. The grouped data and clustered
standard errors are at the region-rural level, with the log odds of female marriage as the
dependent variable. There are 824 educated 20-24 year-old females and 581 uneducated
20-24 year-old females. I find that the results hold even more strongly when applied
to the micro data: a 10 percentage point increase in male HIV rates is associated with
an 18 percent decline in the odds of marriage for an educated female and a 12 percent
increase in the odds of marriage for an uneducated female. However, less than 10% of
the variation in individual marriage behavior is explained.
1.6 Discussion
Taken together, the results by female education and female HIV status isolate selec-
tive search processes and help tie the previous literature together. Magruder suggests
that an age-death profile that is decreasing after age 30 is driven by declining HIV risk
24
after age 30, which is consistent with a model of spousal search. His review of the
literature points to a model of marriage explaining increasing HIV risk past age 30.
Given this, I find that educated females in high-HIV areas face most of their HIV risk
in marriage and that educated females in low-HIV areas AND all uneducated females
face most of their HIV risk in spousal search.
Figures 8-9 display female HIV rate-‘age at marriage’ profiles, by female education
and high/low HIV region. A significantly higher HIV risk is posed through spousal search
than marriage for the uneducated in high- and low-HIV regions and for the educated in
low-HIV regions – those who are less likely to use condoms when single. This is consistent
with late marriage as an HIV risk factor for the sexually active [4], [20], [13], [36]. My
results confirm that late marriage is an HIV risk factor for those who have unprotected
pre-marital sex : the uneducated in high- and low-HIV regions and the educated in low-
HIV regions. The HIV rate-age at marriage profiles of these three groups show that
high rates of HIV infection occur by staying single – through spousal search rather than
marriage. This is because educated females in regions where there is a low probability of
being matched with an infected partner use condoms as infrequently as the uneducated
do in high-risk regions. Average HIV rates are increasing until age 30 and declining after
that for those who face some pre-marital HIV risk. This is consistent with most females
who face a pre-marital risk of HIV infection being infected through spousal search and
having declining HIV-infection profiles and death profiles after age 30.
Figures 8-9 also depict a relatively higher HIV risk posed until the mid-20s through
marriage rather than through spousal search for the educated in high-HIV regions – those
who can enforce condom use when single. This is consistent with early marriage as a
risk factor for sexually-active females [7], [11]. My results confirm that early marriage
is an HIV risk factor for those who face little to no pre-marital HIV risk : the educated
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in high-HIV regions. A higher risk is posed through marriage relative to spousal search
for those who face little to no pre-marital HIV risk–those who are sexually inactive until
marriage and those who use condoms when single. For those not exposed to pre-marital
HIV risk, the HIV risk in marriage – given unprotected sex with one’s husband and the
chance that he has an infected extra-marital partner – is higher than when single. The
HIV rate-age at marriage profile of this one group shows that the HIV risk from within
marriage is increasing as one ages. The expectation is that the increasing HIV rate-age
at marriage profile will be more pronounced as the time frame rolls out, as females older
than 35 in 2007 were not exposed to HIV during spousal search, given the timing of the
epidemic. This is consistent with most females who face little to no pre-marital HIV
risk being infected through marriage and having increasing HIV-infection profiles and
death profiles through age 30.
1.7 Conclusion
In both developed and developing countries, the average female waits until she has
finished school to get married. Because of this, marriage rates are expected to be higher
for less-educated than more-educated female teenagers. Some remaining gap in marriage
rates would be expected even once nearly all females are done with schooling in their
early 20s. Yet there would be no reason to suspect, at first glance, that the marriage gap
would be any different in high- or low-HIV regions. In this paper, I document that a gap
in marriage rates exists between uneducated and educated females that is considerably
larger in high- than low-HIV regions.
Consistent with a search model, educated females do eventually want to marry, they
simply face a friction in the marriage market in unobservable partner HIV status; this
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friction causes educated females to carry out a selective spousal search in high-HIV
regions, which delays marriage. This paper’s main contribution is demonstrating that
marriage is optimal by age 20 – but no younger than 18 – for females who cannot
safeguard against HIV risk when single, and that spousal search is optimal through the
mid-20s for females at high risk of HIV infection who can enforce condom use.
Further implications of my findings include non-pecuniary benefits to education.
The results imply that females might benefit a lot from education, over and above mere
earnings differences. The conventional wisdom is that HIV lessens the incentives to get
an education because life expectancy shrinks. But the implications here are the opposite,
since being better educated can have significant health benefits. Thus, pecuniary returns
to female education are likely to underestimate the actual rates of return since they miss
conceivably substantial health-related benefits.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Solving for Reservation Partner Quality
Uninfected Individual Matches with Uninfected Partner
The value function for an uninfected single individual i who draws a marriage offer
with an uninfected partner j, v(xj , HIV −j |HIV −i ), with xHIVi(j) , satisfies the Bellman
equation:
v(xj , HIV −j |HIV −i ) = max{
xHIV
−
(−)
1− β , V0 + β[(1−Π)
∫
v(xHIV
−
(−) |HIV −i )dF (x′)+ (1.2)
Π(1− P )
∫
v(xHIV
−
(+) |HIV −i )dF (x′) + ΠP
∫
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +i )−D)dF (x′)]
Its solution will be of the form:
v(xj , HIV −j |HIV −i ) = {
xHIV
−
(−)
1− β = V0 + β[(1−Π)
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
−
(−) |HIV −i )dF (x′)+ (1.3)
Π(1−P )
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
−
(+) |HIV −i )dF (x′)+ΠP
∫ B
0
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +i )−D)dF (x′)], if x ≤ x
= {
xHIV
−
(−)
1− β , if x ≥ x
Using equation (2), we can convert the functional equation (1) into an ordinary
equation in the reservation value, xHIV
−
(−) . Evaluating v(xj , HIV
−
j |HIV −i ) and using
equation (2), we have:
xHIV
−
(−)
1− β [
∫ xHIV−
(−)
0
dF (x′) +
∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
dF (x′)] = V0 + β[
∫ xHIV−
(−)
0
xHIV
−
(−)
1− β dF (x
′)+
(1−Π) ∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
x
′HIV−
(−)
1−β dF (x
′) + Π(1− P ) ∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
x
′HIV−
(+)
1−β dF (x
′) +
ΠP
∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
x
′HIV+
(+)−D
1−β dF (x
′)]
or
xHIV
−
(−)
∫ xHIV+
0
dF (x′)− V0 = −
xHIV
−
(−)
1− β
∫ B
xHIV
+
dF (x′)
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β[(1−Π) ∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
x
′HIV−
(−)
1−β dF (x
′) + Π(1− P ) ∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
x
′HIV−
(+)
1−β dF (x
′) +
ΠP
∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
x
′HIV+
(+)−D
1−β dF (x
′)]
Adding xHIV
−
(−)
∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
dF (x′) to both sides gives:
xHIV
−
(−) − V0 =
β
1− β [(1−Π)
∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
(x′HIV
−
(−) − xHIV
−
(−) )dF (x
′)+
Π(1− P )
∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
(x′HIV
−
(+) − xHIV
−
(−) )dF (x
′) + ΠP
∫ B
xHIV
−
(−)
(x′HIV
+
(+) −D − xHIV
−
(−) )dF (x
′)]
In order to evaluate
∫ B
x (x
′ − x)dF (x′), I assume an exponential functional form for
the CDF of F(x), F(x)=1 − e−x. Notice that F(0)=0, F(B)=1-e−B=1 and therefore
e−B=0, and that F(x) is differentiable, with derivative F ′(x) = e−x. Using integration
by parts:
∫ B
x (x− x)dF (x) = 1λe−λx.
xHIV
−
(−) − V0 =
β
1− β [(1−Π)
1
λ
e
−λxHIV−
(−) + Π(1− P ) 1
λ
e
−λxHIV−
(−) + ΠP (
1
λ
−D)e−λxHIV
−
(−) ]
or
xHIV
−
(−) − V0 =
β
1− β [(
1
λ
−ΠPD)e−λxHIV
−
(−) ]
This equation characterizes the determination of the reservation value of partner
quality xHIV
−
(−) for an infected individual draws a marriage offer. The left side is the
cost of searching one more time when an offer xHIV
−
(−) is in hand. The right side is
the expected benefit of searching one more time in terms of the expected present value
associated with drawing x′ > xHIV −(−) . This equation instructs the uninfected agent to
set xHIV
−
(−) so that the cost of searching one more time equals the benefit.
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Infected Individual Matches with Uninfected Partner
The value function for infected single individuals who draw a marriage offer with an
uninfected partner, v(xj , HIV −j |HIV +i ), satisfies the Bellman equation:
v(xj , HIV −j |HIV +i ) = max{
xHIV
+
(−) − V P
1− β , V0+
β[(1−Π)
∫
(v(xHIV
+
(−) |HIV +)− V P )dF (x′) + Π
∫
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+
(+) |HIV +)dF (x′)]
Its solution will be of the form:
v(xj , HIV−|HIV +) = {
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0
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0
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Evaluating v(xj , HIV −j |HIV +i ), we have:
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(−) − V P − V0 =
β
1− β [(1−Π)
1
λ
e
−λxHIV+
(−) + Π(
1
λ
+ V P )e−λx
HIV+
(−) ]
or
xHIV
+
(−) − V P − V0 =
β
1− β [(
1
λ
+ ΠPV )e−λx
HIV+
(−) ]
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Infected Individual Matches with Infected Partner
The value function for infected single individuals who draw a marriage offer with an
infected partner, v(xj , HIV +j |HIV +i ), satisfies:
v(xj , HIV +j |HIV +i ) = max{
xHIV
+
(+)
1− β , V0 + β[(1−Π)(1− P )
∫
v(xHIV
+
(−) |HIV +)dF (x′)+
(1−Π)P
∫
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +)− V )dF (x′) + Π
∫
v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +)dF (x′)]
Its solution will be of the form:
v(xj , HIV+|HIV +) = {
xHIV
+
(+)
1− β = V0 + β[(1−Π)(1− P )
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
+
(−) |HIV +i )dF (x′)+
(1−Π)P
∫ B
0
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +i )− V )dF (x′) + Π
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +i )dF (x′)], if x ≤ x
= {
xHIV
+
(+)
1− β , if x ≥ x
Evaluating v(xj , HIV +j |HIV +i ) and using equation (2), we have:
xHIV
+
(+)
1− β [
∫ xHIV+
(+)
0
dF (x′) +
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
dF (x′)] = V0 + β[
∫ xHIV+
(+)
0
xHIV
+
(+)
1− β dF (x
′)
+(1−Π)(1− P )
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x
′HIV +
(−)
1− β dF (x
′)+
(1−Π)P
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x
′HIV +
(+) − V
1− β dF (x
′) + Π
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x
′HIV +
(+)
1− β dF (x
′)]
or
xHIV
+
(+)
∫ HIV +(+)
0
dF (x′)−V0 = −
xHIV
+
(+)
1− β
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
dF (x′)+β[(1−Π)(1−P )
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x
′HIV +
(−)
1− β dF (x
′)+
(1−Π)P
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x
′HIV +
(+) − V
1− β dF (x
′) + Π
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x
′HIV +
(+)
1− β dF (x
′)]
Adding xHIV
+
(+)
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
dF (x′) to both sides gives:
xHIV
+
(+) − V0 =
β
1− β [(1−Π)(1− P )
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
(x′HIV
−
(−) − xHIV
+
(+) )dF (x
′)+
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(1−Π)P
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
(x′HIV
+
(+) − V − xHIV
+
(+) )dF (x
′) + Π
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
(x′HIV
+
(+) − xHIV
+
(+) )dF (x
′)]
or
xHIV
+
(+) −V0 =
β
1− β [(1−Π)(1−P )
1
λ
e
−λxHIV+
(+) +(1−Π)P ( 1
λ
−V )e−λxHIV
+
(+) +Π
1
λ
e
−λxHIV+
(+) ]
or
xHIV
+
(+) − V0 =
β
1− β [(
1
λ
− (1−Π)PV )e−λxHIV
+
(+) ]
Uninfected Individual Matches with Infected Partner
The value function for uninfected single individuals who draw a marriage offer with
an infected partner, v(xj , HIV +j |HIV −i ), satisfies:
v(xj , HIV +j |HIV −i ) = max{
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D) + (1− P )xHIV
−
(+)
1− β , V0+
β[P (1−Π)(1−P )
∫
v(xHIV
+
(−) |HIV +)dF (x′)+P (1−Π)P
∫
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +)−V )dF (x′)+
PΠ
∫
v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +)dF (x′) + (1− P )(1−Π)
∫
v(xHIV
−
(−) |HIV −)dF (x′)+
(1−P )Π(1−P )
∫
v(xHIV
−
(+) |HIV −)dF (x′)+(1−P )ΠP
∫
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV −)−D)dF (x′)]
Its solution will be of the form:
v(xj , HIV+|HIV −) = {
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D) + (1− P )xHIV
−
(+)
1− β , V0+
β[P (1−Π)(1−P )
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
+
(−) |HIV +)dF (x′)+P (1−Π)P
∫ B
0
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +)−V )dF (x′)+
PΠ
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV +)dF (x′) + (1− P )(1−Π)
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
−
(−) |HIV −)dF (x′)+
(1−P )Π(1−P )
∫ B
0
v(xHIV
−
(+) |HIV −)dF (x′)+(1−P )ΠP
∫ B
0
(v(xHIV
+
(+) |HIV −)−D)dF (x′)], if x ≤ x
= {
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D) + (1− P )xHIV
−
(+)
1− β , if x ≥ x
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Evaluating v(xj , HIV+|HIV −) and using equation (2), we have:
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D)
1− β [
∫ xHIV+
(+)
0
dF (x′)+
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
dF (x′)]
(1− P )xHIV −(+)
1− β [
∫ xHIV−
(+)
0
dF (x′)+
∫ B
xHIV
−
(+)
dF (x′)]
= V0 +
β
1− β [P
∫ xHIV+
(+)
0
(xHIV
+
(+) −D)
1− β + (1− P )
∫ xHIV−
(+)
0
xHIV
−
(+)
1− β
P (1−Π)(1− P )
∫ HIV +(+)
0
x′HIV
+
(−) dF (x
′) + P (1−Π)P
∫ HIV +(+)
0
(x′HIV
+
(+) − V )dF (x′)+
PΠ
∫ HIV +(+)
0
x′HIV
+
(+) dF (x
′) + (1− P )(1−Π)
∫ HIV +(−)
0
x′HIV
−
(−) dF (x
′)+
(1− P )Π(1− P )
∫ HIV +(−)
0
x′HIV
−
(+) dF (x
′) + (1− P )ΠP
∫ HIV +(−)
0
(x′HIV
+
(+) −D)F (x′)]
Adding P (xHIV
+
(+) − D)
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
dF (x′) + (1 − P )xHIV −(+)
∫ B
xHIV
−
(+)
dF (x′) to both sides
gives:
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D)+(1−P )xHIV
−
(+) −V0 =
β
1− β [P (1−Π)(1−P )
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x′HIV
+
(−) −(xHIV
+
(+) −D)dF (x′)+
P (1−Π)P
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x′HIV
+
(+) −V−(xHIV
+
(+) −D)dF (x′)+PΠ
∫ B
xHIV
+
(+)
x′HIV
+
(+) −(xHIV
+
(+) −D)dF (x′)+
(1−P )(1−Π)
∫ B
xHIV
−
(+)
x′HIV
−
(−) −xHIV
−
(+) dF (x
′)+(1−P )Π(1−P )
∫ B
xHIV
−
(+)
x′HIV
−
(+) −xHIV
−
(+) dF (x
′)+
(1− P )ΠP
∫ B
xHIV
−
(+)
(x′HIV
+
(+) −D)− xHIV
−
(+) F (x
′)]
or
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D) + (1− P )xHIV
−
(+) − V0 =
β
1− β [
P (1−Π)(1−P )( 1
λ
+D)e−λx
HIV+
(+) +P (1−Π)P ( 1
λ
−V+D)e−λxHIV
+
(+) +PΠ(
1
λ
+D)e−λx
HIV+
(+) +
(1−P )(1−Π) 1
λ
e
−λxHIV−
(+) + (1−P )Π(1−P ) 1
λ
e
−λxHIV−
(+) + (1−P )ΠP ( 1
λ
+D)e−λx
HIV−
(+) ]
or
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D) + (1− P )xHIV
−
(+) − V0 =
β
1− β [
P (
1
λ
− (1−Π)PV +D)e−λxHIV
+
(+) + (1− P )( 1
λ
− PΠD)e−λxHIV
−
(+) ]
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1.8.2 Comparative Statics
Uninfected Individual Matches with Uninfected Partner
The comparative statics for an uninfected individual matched with an uninfected
partner are first and second derivatives of h(xHIV
−
(−) ) =
β
1−β [(
1
λ −ΠPD)e
−λxHIV−
(−) ]:
1.
∂h(xHIV
−
(−) )
∂Π = − β1−βPDe
−λxHIV−
(−) < 0
2. ∂(
∂h(xHIV
−
(−) )
∂Π
)
∂P = − β1−βDe
−λxHIV−
(−) < 0
3.
∂xHIV
−
(−) −V0
∂V0
<0
Uninfected Individual Matches with Infected Partner
The equation that characterizes the determination of the reservation value of partner
quality for an uninfected individual matched with an infected partner is:
P (xHIV
+
(+) −D) + (1− P )xHIV
−
(+) − V0 =
β
1− β [
P (
1
λ
− (1−Π)PV +D)e−λxHIV
+
(+) + (1− P )( 1
λ
− PΠD)e−λxHIV
−
(+) ]
with h(xHIV
+
(−) ) =
β
1−β [P (
1
λ − (1−Π)PV +D)e
−λxHIV+
(+) + (1−P )( 1λ −PΠD)e
−λxHIV−
(+) ].
(See Figure A.2).
1.
∂h(xHIV
+
(−) )
∂Π =
β
1−β [(P
2V +D + ( 1λ − (1−Π)PV +D))e
−λxHIV+
(+) +−(( 1λ − PΠD) +
(P (1 − P )D))e−λxHIV
−
(+) ] < 0: With HIV rates low, an uninfected individual who
rejects a draw with an infected partner has a good chance of finding a high quality
uninfected individual next period. As HIV rates increase, finding an uninfected
partner becomes less possible, and the standards for partner quality are lowered.
That is, as Π increases, the function h(xHIV
+
(−) ) falls, which decreases reservation
quality xHIV
+
(−) and waiting time N
HIV +
(−) .
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2.
∂h(xHIV
+
(−) )
∂Π
∂P =
β
1−β [(Π + 2P )V e
−λxHIV+
(+) + (Π + 2P − 1)De−λxHIV
−
(+) ] >0: As the risk
of HIV infection increases, the effect of HIV on the reservation value of partner
quality becomes stronger for an infected individual matched with an uninfected
partner. The disutility from infecting a partner can cause them to reject the cur-
rent match and the existence of more infected individuals allows them to increase
their reservation value of partner quality, for reasonable parameter values of P, i.e.
P<.5.
3.
∂P (xHIV
+
(+)
−D)+(1−P )xHIV−
(+)
−V0
∂V0
<0: An increase in the option value decreases the
cost of further spousal search, making a delay in marriage possible.
4. Note that the cost of search is also decreasing in the infection rate, P. An increase
in P lowers the intercept on search, increasing reservation partner quality further
and allowing for a delay in marriage.
Infected Individual Matches with Infected Partner
The equation that characterizes the determination of the reservation value of partner
quality for an infected individual matched with an infected partner is:
xHIV
+
(+) − V0 =
β
1− β [(
1
λ
− (1−Π)PV )e−λxHIV
+
(+) ]
and define the right side as h(xHIV
+
(+) ) =
β
1−β [(
1
λ − (1 − Π)PV )e
−λxHIV+
(+) ]. (See Figure
A.3).
1.
∂h(xHIV
+
(+)
)
∂Π =
β
1−βPV e
−λxHIV+
(+) >0: As HIV rates increase, an infected indiviudals
who draws a match with an infected partner will see a benefit in continuing to
search. Being matched with a same-HIV status partner when HIV rates are low
is valuable, as there are few infected partners available and a big disutility from
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infecting an uninfected draw next period. As HIV rates rise, there are more options
available over infected partners and one can be more selective, only accepting a
match with a high partner quality.
2. ∂
∂h(xHIV
+
(+)
)
∂Π
∂P =
β
1−βV e
−λxHIV+
(+) >0: For those with higher infection probabilities (un-
educated females) where HIV rates are high, the possibility of rejecting a current
match and finding a better quality partner outweighs the now smaller disutility of
infecting an uninfected match next period, as the uninfected are a proportionally
smaller population in high-HIV regions.
3.
∂xHIV
+
(+)
∂V0
<0: A higher outside option increases reservation quality.
Infected Individual Matches with Uninfected Partner
The equation that characterizes the determination of the reservation value of partner
quality for an infected individual matched with an uninfected partner is:
xHIV
+
(−) − V P − V0 =
β
1− β [(
1
λ
+ ΠPV )e−λx
HIV+
(−) ]
and define the right side as h(xHIV
+
(−) ) =
β
1−β [(
1
λ + ΠPV )e
−λxHIV+
(−) ]. (See Figure A.4).
Although h(x) differs for infected individuals depending on the type of partner they
match with, their first and second order conditions are identical.
1.
∂h(xHIV
+
(−) )
∂Π =
β
1−βPV e
−λxHIV+
(−) >0:
2. ∂
∂h(xHIV
+
(−) )
∂Π
∂P =
β
1−βV e
−λxHIV+
(−) >0:
3.
∂xHIV
+
(−)
∂V0
<0: A higher outside
4. Note that the cost of search is again decreasing in the infection rate, allowing for
a marriage delay.
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Figure A.1. Uninfected Individual Matched with Uninfected Partner
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Figure A.2.
Figure A.3.
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Figure A.4.
Figure A.5.
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Table A.1.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Widow Remarriage
on Child School Enrollment
2.1 Introduction
This paper examines whether widow remarriage is beneficial to child school enroll-
ment in Sub Saharan Africa. I exploit exogenous regional variation in HIV, religion,
and the sex ratio to identify the effect of remarriage by widowed mothers on child school
enrollment within a country. The prevalence of widowhood in Sub Saharan Africa has
increased substantially since the HIV epidemic began spreading in the early 1980s. The
population of interest, widowed women with school-aged children, has also grown dis-
proportionately and is uniquely vulnerable relative to male widowers with school-aged
children.1 Given the sheer size of this vulnerable population and the disparity in cur-
1In high-HIV areas, this may be due to women marrying older men who have longer pre-marital
sexual histories and are more likely to have extramarital partners than themselves, and thus have a
greater likelihood of becoming HIV-infected and dying from AIDS before their wives. Men are also
more likely to partake in and die from armed combat than are women. As most African tribes are
patrilineal, widowed women are vulnerable relative to male widowers as the widow’s late husband’s
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rent and future outcomes between orphans and non-orphans, it is important to locate
behavioral responses that a widow can take to improve the probability of enrolling her
child in school.2
The effect of widow remarriage on child school enrollment has not been studied.
This paper builds on the parental death and child education literature, namely on the
finding that the death of a mother hurts child education more so than does the death of
a father. Specifically, three panel-data studies find that a mother’s death significantly
lowers child school enrollment, years of schooling and education expenditures relative to
non-orphans, whereas a father’s death has less of an effect than does a mother’s death
and sometimes has no effect at all [16], [23], [30]. That paternal orphans, on average, are
as likely to be enrolled in school as non-orphans masks important enrollment differences
across households who have experienced a father’s death. Also in the parental death
literature, Case et al. find that the likelihood of child school enrollment after a parent’s
death is highly contingent upon the degree of closeness to the household head [15]. In
the parental death and child mortality literature, the death of a mother and even a ma-
ternal grandmother are associated with a greater likelihood of malnourishment and child
mortality relative to non-orphanhood, whereas a father’s death has no effect on child
mortality [26], [34], [35]. Outside of the parental death literature, there is strong evi-
family has the customary right to take back any of the deceased’s property after his death.
2In my sample of ten African countries, 15% of children 6-14 years old are orphans. Long-term
impacts of orphanhood include fewer years of schooling, reduced height, and adult poverty (a lifelong
deficit in consumer expenditures of 8.5%) [4]. Policy interest in making sure that orphans’s schooling
does not fall behind in part prompted the United Nation’s shift toward promoting universal primary
school education, gender equality, and curbing HIV rates in 2000. There is a direct cost to schooling-
tuition fees, school uniforms, books, supplies-and an opportunity cost of the child’s time spent traveling
to and from school, attending school, when he/she could have been helping their widowed mother in the
field, with household chores, or watching younger siblings.
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dence of a link between maternal schooling and child education that is more consistently
positive than between father’s schooling and child education [7], [8], [13], [11].
I add to the literature by pulling back the curtain on the average enrollment outcome
experienced after a father’s death and analyzing the impact of a widow’s decision to
remarry on her child’s school enrollment. Specifically, on a cross-country sample of
school-aged paternal orphans living with their mothers, I estimate the effect of a mother’s
remarriage on her child’s school enrollment status, separately for mothers with less than
six years and at least six years of schooling.3 Past data deficiencies may have precluded
such a causal analysis. In particular, it is hard to study the remarriage decision in
Africa without looking at a root cause of widowhood: HIV/AIDS. Due to recently-
released cross-sections from the Demographic & Health Surveys (DHS), the opportunity
arose to study exactly this. In addition to most DHS cross-sections that include religion
and orphanhood status, the most-recent DHS cross-sections – which include HIV status
and male circumcision – allow me to exploit exogenous variation in HIV rates, religion
and local sex ratios across regions in order to explain remarriage decisions of widows
within a country.4 Male HIV rates proxy for the female risk of HIV infection and,
given that DHS data do not contain the husband’s cause of death, the likelihood that
a widow’s husband died of AIDS. I present three-stage maximum likelihood estimates
of child school enrollment, widow remarriage, and male HIV rates, accounting for all
3I perform specification tests varying the cutoff of mother’s education; results qualitatively hold for
between three and seven years of education.
4Educated (uneducated) females are less (more) likely to marry where the risk of HIV infection is
high [38]. Widowhood is quite high where male HIV rates are high, as many husbands likely died from
AIDS in these areas. In 2002, AIDS was the leading cause in five of the ten countries in the sample
(Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and the second leading cause of death in two of
the ten countries (Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia), the 5th in Guinea, 8th in Senegal, and
not even top ten in Niger [44].
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potential endogeneity, where enrollment and remarriage are binary dependent variables,
and the HIV rate is a continuous dependent variable.
My empirical results indicate that remarriage is detrimental to child school enroll-
ment for widows with less than six years of schooling (uneducated), but beneficial to
child school enrollment for widows with at least six years of schooling (educated). Among
uneducated widows, remarriage lowers the likelihood of enrolling one’s child in school
by 27%. Among educated widows, remarriage increases the likelihood of child school
enrollment by 15%. The positive effect of educated widow remarriage on child schooling
only appears once I account for endogeneity. These results are significant at the 5% and
1% level, respectively, and significantly different from one another, even controlling for
household wealth quintile, a rural fixed effect, and regional education and employment
rates.
The findings are consistent with marital sorting of couples by education, intra-
household bargaining, and/or differences in tastes for schooling and remarriage. Each
partner brings to the marriage their assets and labor income; the husband may have
children as well if he is polygymous. With a correlation of 0.7 between a widow’s and
her husband’s schooling, an educated widow is more likely to marry an educated man
if she remarries and that well-educated couple is less likely to be resource-constrained
than she would alone. This allows the well-educated couple to invest in the education of
her, and perhaps all, children in the household should they have higher marginal rates
of return to schooling than marginal cost, especially if both parents have an unobserved
taste for schooling.
Uneducated widowed mothers may be more attractive to males working in subsis-
tence agriculture and also less likely to enroll their children in school should they marry
such a male. Among males working in agriculture, there may be greater demand for a
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widow who is willing to marry and has kids, but little leverage. The male may expect to
use the children as unpaid manual labor, i.e. as a small workforce, rather than enroll her
children in school. An uneducated widow is more likely to need to marry to make ends
meet and assortatively match with an uneducated male. She may expect her children
to be more likely to be enrolled once she remarries, yet if spousal preferences conflict
and his bargaining power is greater than hers, the poorly-educated couple will be less
likely to enroll her child(ren) in school than if she had not remarried.5 Otherwise, the
couple may have equally low tastes for schooling or low expectations about the relative
returns to her child(ren)’s education.
A policy implication is that there is a multiplier effect on investment in female
education in high-HIV areas – where the prevalence of orphans and widows are highest
and where females are most likely to become widows. Reducing school fees, providing
school uniforms or even deworming in high-HIV areas where access to education is lowest
could ease the fiscal burden on the marginal widow deciding whether she can afford child
schooling. Targeted investments may increase intergenerational mobility, allowing her
daughter to be the first in the family to complete primary school, marry an educated
husband, and boost her own children’s schooling one day.
In the remainder of the paper, I present the empirical specification, describe the data
and sample selection, present empirical results, and conclude.
2.2 Empirical Specification
The system of equations to be estimated is:
y∗1 = β0 + β1y
∗
2 + Z
′
1β2 + (u1jrc + 1kijrc)
5When resource-constrained, household decision-maker(s) will invest in children with the highest
marginal rates of return to schooling.
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y∗2 = α0 + α1y3 + Z
′
2α2 + (u2jrc + 2kijrc)
y3 = γ0 + Z ′3γ1 + (u3jrc + 3kijrc)
which is a fully recursive system of equations, where y∗1 is the school enrollment status of
child k, born to mother i, in household j, region-rural r, country c; y∗2 is the remarriage
decision of mother i, in household j, region-rural r, country c; y3 is the male HIV rate
in region-rural r, country c; and Z is a set of exogenous variables. Household-level
unobservable, ugjrc, is constant among siblings within a household but varies across
households; gkijrc is an idiosyncratic child-level unobservable, with g=1, 2, 3.
If the errors are uncorrelated, there is no econometric problem. The system of
equations is identified and can be consistently estimated by full-information maximum
likelihood.
If any of the pair-wise errors are correlated, however, exclusion restrictions are
needed for identification. Idiosyncratic unobservables for children’s enrollment, 1kijrc,
and mother’s remarriage, 2kijrc, are likely correlated; that is, mother’s remarriage
is potentially endogenous in the child enrollment equation. Educated mothers may
not need to remarry and yet may be able to easily keep their child(ren) in school
(ρ12 = corr(1kijrc, 2kijrc) < 0 for educated mothers). Uneducated mothers may find
their children’s education to be low-priority and may also be undesirable wives (ρ12 > 0
for uneducated mothers).
Unobservable determinants of mother’s remarriage, 2kijrc, and male HIV rates,
3kijrc, are likely correlated as well. Omitted variables, such as tribal customs, that
are correlated with both male HIV rates and the marital status of widows will cause
endogeneity of male HIV rates in the remarriage equation. Tribal customs may dictate
that marriage is universal but having extramarital partners is culturally acceptable,
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which raises HIV rates (ρ23 > 0).
With correlated errors, the system of equations is identified as long as at least one
exclusion restriction is imposed for each endogenous variable. First, the y∗2 equation
must contain at least one exogenous variable that is not in the y∗1 equation; i.e. an
instrument that is highly correlated with y∗2 but uncorrelated with unobservable deter-
minants of child enrollment, 1kijrc. Second, the y3 equation must also contain at least
one exogenous variable that is not in the y∗2 equation.
In the y∗2 equation, I instrument for widow remarriage with the percent of adults
who are Muslim and the sex ratio in a region-rural area. I exploit variation in the
percent Muslim and the sex ratio in a region-rural area to explain variation in the
remarriage decision of widows across marriage markets within a country. The percent
Muslim in a region-rural area is positively correlated with marriage; there is less of a
constraint on the supply of males in high-Muslim areas, where males can have up to four
wives by Sharia law and are more likely to be polygymous. Percent Muslim is a valid
instrument if it exogenously shifts marriage and only affects school enrollment through
remarriage. Even if school enrollment rates differ in high-Muslim and low-Muslim areas
unconditionally (i.e. if Christian schools differ from Muslim madrasas), as long as they
do not differ after conditioning on exogenous variables including adult education rates,
then percent Muslim is a valid instrument. This would be the case if there have not
been substantial changes in the schooling composition between the parent’s and child’s
generation, as the adult education rate will pick up any differences in schooling patterns
by religion, within a region. The conditional validity of the percent Muslim in a region
as an instrument for widow remarriage can be tested, as the model is overidentified.
For validity as an instrument, the sex ratio in a region-rural area should affect the
supply of partners and thus the remarriage possibilities, conditional on HIV rates, but
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not the enrollment status of children. The higher the sex ratio, the greater the excess
supply of females and relative scarcity of males, and the lower is the expectation of
female marriage rates. Holding the death risk from HIV constant, the local sex ratio
exogenously changes the partner supply for widows and, thereby, remarriage decisions.
Even if school enrollment rates differ in high- and low-sex ratio areas unconditionally
(i.e. if bargaining power is greater in low-sex ratio regions), as long as they do not differ
after conditioning on exogenous variables including adult education rates, the percent
Muslim, and fitted HIV rates, then the local sex ratio is a valid instrument. Again, this
should hold as long as the schooling composition is not significantly different between a
parent’s and child’s generation, as the death risk from HIV, religion, and adult education
rates will pick up any differences in the gradient of schooling patterns by the sex ratio,
within a region. Its conditional validity as an instrument can be tested as well, as the
model is overidentified.
Second, in the y3 equation, I instrument for male HIV rates with male circumcision
rates, both at the region-rural level. Male circumcision cuts the risk of male HIV in-
fection by 60%. To be a valid instrument, male circumcision should only affect widow
remarriage through male HIV rates. Any concern that uninfected widows targeted cir-
cumcised males in the marriage market is minimized given that the roll-out of medical
circumcision campaigns began after 2007, after all surveys were completed (2004-2007)
in the sample I use [2], [3], [38]. 6 A negative correlation is expected between circumci-
6Randomized controlled trials of male circumcision that were completed in Uganda and Kenya in
2007 found that male circumcision is medically protective against HIV risk. After 2007, the Population
Council began designing a roll-out of medical circumcision of males. As of 2010, no men had been
medically circumcised in Zambia, according to the Population Council. This reduces concerns of any
medical circumcision information campaigns occurring by the time of the interview between 2004 and
2007, as well as females knowing that males who are circumcised are at lower HIV risk.
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sion and male HIV rates. As circumcision rates are higher among Muslims, a positive
correlation between circumcision and male HIV rates would suggest that, holding reli-
gion constant, there is a high density of tribes who practice circumcision and also have
higher HIV rates.
Once I instrument for y3 and y∗2, the system of equations is properly identified and
can be consistently estimated. Another econometric issue is the household-level unob-
servable, which is identical for all siblings in a household but varies across households,
for which I cluster the standard errors at the household level.
I estimate the system of equations with a full-information maximum likelihood esti-
mator, called a conditional (recursive) mixed process estimator [41]. I assume that the
Z satisfy E(Z ′gkijrc)=0, with g=1,2,3, that the idiosyncratic unobservables are drawn
from a joint normal distribution and are mean-zero, and that the variance of gkijrc
is normalized to one. The covariance of the idiosyncratic errors across equations are
allowed to be non-zero, with ρ12 = corr(1kijrc, 2kijrc), and likewise for ρ23 and ρ13. I
specify probit specifications for the y∗1 and y∗2 equations and a linear specification for
the y3 equation.
2.3 Data & Sample Selection
I analyze individual-level DHS data from nationally-representative samples of house-
holds in ten Sub Saharan African countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007;
Guinea, 2005; Ethiopia, 2004; Malawi, 2005; Niger, 2006; Senegal, 2005; Swaziland,
2007; Tanzania, 2007; Zambia, 2007; Zimbabwe, 2005 [20]. I selected this ten-country
sample from the twenty-eight Sub Saharan countries in DHS with repeated cross-sections
as this subset contained orphanhood status (most recent cross-section(s) for all twenty-
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eight countries), HIV status of adults consenting to HIV testing (most recent cross-
section for twenty-two countries and the past two cross-sections for four countries), and
information on the amount of property inherited by a widow after her husband’s death
(most recent cross-section for thirteen countries).
Children aged seventeen and younger were asked whether their mother and father
are currently alive and, if so, their household observation number. I define a paternal
orphan as a child whose father has passed away but whose mother is still alive. I restrict
the sample to paternal orphans of primary school-age (6-14 years old) who are living with
their mother. I consider each mother of a paternal orphan to be a widow. I include the
mother’s demographic and health information in each of her child(ren)’s observations;
each retained observation is a unique child-mother pair. The main variables of interest
are child school enrollment status - a binary for currently enrolled in school - and whether
the child’s mother is currently married - a binary for currently married or cohabiting
(considered married in the marriage literature on Sub Saharan Africa).
I use region-rural-level, household-level, mother-level, and child-level variables in the
analysis. Region-rural-level variables include the male HIV rate, male circumcision rate,
average years of education for males, the male employment rate, the percent of adults
who are Muslim, the female-male sex ratio within a ten-year age group and a rural
binary. A 29-year old female is within the 25-34 year old age group, whereas a 35-year
old female is within the 35-44 year old age group. To construct region-rural averages, a
binary for “male is HIV-positive” is weighted with HIV weights, while binaries for “male
is circumcised,” “male is currently employed,” “religion is Muslim,” and continuous
“male years of schooling” and “sex ratio” are weighted with individual weights. Because
religion is missing as a variable in the Tanzania 2007 cross-section, I use religion in the
Tanzania 2004 cross-section to construct weighted percent Muslim in a region-rural
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area. Adult males aged 15-59 and adult females aged 15-49 were asked if they would
consent to a finger-prick blood test, from which an HIV test result would be taken and
confidentially used in the survey data. Roughly 51% of females and 42% of males in the
unrestricted sample consented to HIV testing.
Household-level variables include the number of primary school-aged paternal or-
phans in the household, the total number of other children aged 0-17 in the household
(including paternal orphans younger than 6 or older than 14) and the durable goods
wealth quintile of the household. I weight all regressions with the household weight.
Mother-level variables used are binary variables for currently married and for six or
more years of education. A widow’s marital status (not having remarried since her
husband’s death) may be a direct function of male HIV rates, given that AIDS is the
leading or second leading cause of death in seven of the ten countries in the sample.
An uninfected widow or a widow who does not know her HIV status may also be less
likely to remarry where the risk of HIV infection is high. Thirty-six percent of widowed
mothers in the sample have six or more years of schooling, 46% have no formal educa-
tion, and the average years of schooling is 4. Child-level variables used are a binary for
current school enrollment, gender, age, and birth order among biological siblings in the
household.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on all variables used in the analysis, by whether
it is at the region-rural-, household-, mother-, or child-level. Of 130,000 school-aged
children in my ten-country sample, 20,000 are orphans, 12,000 are paternal orphans,
7,218 are paternal orphans living with their mother, and for the final sample of 5,651
school-aged paternal orphans living with their mother, I have information on child school
enrollment, mother’s marital status, and mother’s years of schooling. There are 3,282
widowed mothers to these 5,651 school-aged paternal orphans. There are 1,923 paternal
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orphans to mothers with at least six years of schooling and 3,669 paternal orphans to
mothers with less than six years of schooling. The average number of paternal orphans
aged 6-14 per household is 2.2. Fifty-nine percent of children’s mothers consented to
HIV testing, that is, 3,330 child-mother pairs; 33% of children’s mothers who consented
to testing are HIV-positive. Twenty-seven percent of children’s mothers are remarried.
Average adult male HIV rates at the region-rural level are 6.9% and range from 0% to
37.5%.
2.3.1 Validity of Instruments
Table 2 displays identification tests for the first-stage regression of widow remarriage
on percent Muslims and the sex ratio, as well as fitted HIV rates and exogenous variables
in Z2. I perform limited information maximum likelihood estimation (LIML). In the
LIML regression of child enrollment on widow remarriage, I instrument for remarriage
with percent Muslims, the sex ratio, and fitted HIV rates. I can reject the null hypotheses
that widow remarriage is underidentified. For weak identification, with a null hypothesis
that the instruments should be included in the enrollment equation, I can also reject
the null. For the overidentification test, the null hypothesis specifies that, conditional
on instrument one being valid, instrument two is valid, and vice versa; I fail to reject
the null, which is preferred. Therefore, percent Muslim and the sex ratio are both
conditionally valid instruments.
The sex ratio is negatively correlated with remarriage for uneducated (less desir-
able) widows: the scarcer are males, the fewer are remarriage possibilities. Areas that
consistently have high sex ratios may have adapted by using social arrangements to
accommodate the excess supply of females, such as polygymy, the acceptability of re-
marriage, and even wife inheritance. In these high-sex ratio areas, educated (more
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desirable) widows will be in greater relative demand. This is consistent with the posi-
tive association between the sex ratio and remarriage for educated widows. The percent
Muslim in a region is positively correlated with remarriage for both educated and une-
ducated widows. This is consistent with Sharia law, in that Muslim males do not have
an upper bound of one wife, but four.
I also perform a LIML regression of widow remarriage on male HIV rates, instru-
menting for male HIV rates with male circumcision rates. The equation is exactly
identified, therefore I cannot test for its conditional validity. Circumcision is negatively
correlated with male HIV rates, as expected, in areas where there is a high density of
educated widows. Circumcision is positively correlated with male HIV rates, however,
in areas where there is a high density of uneducated widows. As Muslims are more likely
to be circumcised, once I condition on religion, areas with a high density of uneducated
widows are populated with tribes who practice circumcision and have higher HIV rates.
2.4 Results
Table 3 presents results from three-stage maximum likelihood estimation. Each
column is a separate regression for widows with six or more years of schooling (educated)
and for widows with less than six years of schooling (uneducated). The empirical results
indicate that among school-aged paternal orphans living with their mother, a mother’s
remarriage decreases the likelihood of school enrollment by 27% if the mother has less
than six years of schooling, while it increases the probability of school enrollment by
15% if the mother has six or more years of schooling.
In Table 3, columns (1) through (5) iteratively add exogenous variables to the system
of equations. In column (1), for the third-stage probit marginal effects, the unconditional
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effect of an uneducated mother’s remarriage is a 53% reduction in the likelihood of her
child’s school enrollment, and is significant at the 1% level. The effect of an uneducated
mother’s remarriage remains robust with significance at the 1% level after each iteration,
attenuating by about half to a reduction in the likelihood of schooling of 27% after all
controls are added.
Also in Table 3, column (1), the unconditional effect of an educated mother’s remar-
riage on her child’s school enrollment is negative and insignificant. This effect becomes
a significant 11% increased likelihood once country fixed effects are added (column (2)),
loses significance after controlling for child age fixed effects, child gender, and regional
education and employment rates (column (3)), increases in magnitude and significance
to 17% once a rural binary, household durable assets fixed effects, and mother’s age
are added (column (4)) and, lastly, the effect is a significant 15% at the 5% level after
controlling for birth order fixed effects, the number of school-aged paternal orphans and
other children in the household (column (5)).7
7In Table 3 (not shown), adult education rates have no effect on the enrollment of children of educated
mothers, but do increase enrollment for children of uneducated mothers. All else constant, school
enrollment rates are higher for paternal orphans of uneducated mothers living in rural areas, but no
different for paternal orphans of educated mothers. The number of school-aged paternal orphans in the
household has no effect on the probability of school enrollment, but, controlling for mother’s marital
status, more children in the household other than school-aged paternal orphans hurts the chances of
schooling for paternal orphans, regardless of their mother’s education. Being in a higher wealth quintile
(having more durable assets in the household) increases the likelihood of school enrollment for paternal
orphans (not shown). Systematic trends in enrollment appear based on the birth order of biological
paternal orphans. Middle children (4th born) of uneducated mothers fare worse than first-born children,
per the resource dilution hypothesis (birth order 5, 6, and 7 are insignificant and not shown). The oldest
child of educated widowed mothers is squeezed out of schooling likely to help provide for younger siblings
(3rd born is most likely to be enrolled), as with the conditional altruism and credit constraints hypothesis.
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In Table 3, I also present the second-stage probit marginal effects, for the effect of
male HIV rates on mother’s remarriage. There is a negative association between male
HIV rates and remarriage for educated widows and a positive association between male
HIV and remarriage for uneducated widows. A widow’s decision not to remarry may be
based on high HIV rates - and thus a high risk of HIV infection - in her region if she
is uninfected, does not know her HIV status, or if she knows she is infected and does
not want to further transmit HIV. The results are consistent with descriptive statistics:
educated widows are more likely to know their HIV status and are more likely to be
HIV-positive; they are making a more-informed decision not to remarry. Uneducated
widows are less likely to know their HIV status but also less likely to be HIV-positive.
This is consistent with being less informed but less worried about the risks (feeling safer
from HIV risk by being married than single, or believing one’s husband did not die from
AIDS and there is no need to get HIV-tested) as well as remarriage out of necessity –
HIV rates may be picking up some measure of poverty and destitution that household
wealth fixed effects are not.8
This may be especially likely if the oldest child was taken out of school around the time of the father’s
death. Daughters of widows are no less likely to be enrolled than are sons (not shown). Compared to
six year-olds, paternal orphans aged 7-14 are all more likely to be enrolled in school (not shown). There
is no relationship between a mother’s age and the likelihood of her enrolling her child(ren) in school,
ceteris paribus.
8Of interest in the second-stage regression in Table 3 is the lower probability of remarriage for
older widows and widows with the option of living in higher-wealth quintile households (if have a
wealthy extended family, there is less of a need to marry); there is a higher likelihood of remarriage for
educated widows the higher are male education rates (positive assortative matching on education, before
controlling for rural residence) and for all widows the higher are male employment rates (employed males
are better able to take on a first wife or co-wife and are more attractive to widows). Uneducated widows
are less likely to remarry the more school-aged paternal orphans they have. Educated widows are more
willing to remarry the more other children are in the household, which includes any of her children who
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The Table 3 first-stage estimates of male HIV rates display the same correlations
between circumcision and male HIV rates found in Table 2: negative where educated
widows are densely populated and positive where uneducated widows are densely pop-
ulated.
Table 4 varies the cutoff for separating the regressions by mother’s education. The
results qualitatively hold for an education cutoff of between three and seven years of
schooling. Using the same controls in this three-stage maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) as in Table 3, a mother’s remarriage increases the likelihood of her child’s school
enrollment by 19% if the mother has at least three years of schooling, by 17% if she has
at least five years of schooling, and by 15% with at least six years of schooling, but has
an insignificant effect otherwise. A mother’s remarriage decreases the probability of her
child being in school by 21% if she has less than three years of schooling, by 20% with
less than four years, by 27% with less than six, and by 23% with less than seven.
Table 5 demonstrates the importance of model specification and accounting for en-
dogeneity. I present (1) probit marginal effects of widow remarriage on child school
enrollment, ignoring the potential endogeneity of (a) widow remarriage with respect to
child school enrollment and (b) male HIV rates with respect to widow remarriage; (2)
bivariate probit estimates of the effect of widow remarriage on child school enrollment
and of male HIV rates on widow remarriage, ignoring the potential endogeneity of male
HIV rates with respect to widow remarriage; and (3) three-stage maximum likelihood
estimates of child school enrollment, widow remarriage, and male HIV rates, where male
HIV rates is a linear regression, and account for all potential endogeneity. I use the same
are younger than six or greater than fourteen and any children a potential husband or anyone he lives
with may have. This is consistent with “the more the merrier” hypothesis that larger family sizes in
Sub Saharan Africa are conducive to child education, with extended families lending help [12].
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controls in each stage as in Tables 3 and 4. The third-stage MLE estimates are the exact
same as in column (5) of Table 3 and Table 4 with a cutoff of six years of schooling.
In Table 5, for uneducated widows, the detrimental effect of remarriage on child
school enrollment is present even without correcting for endogeneity. In the probit
and bivariate probit estimation, respectively, the effect is a negative and significant
15% which strengthens to a negative and significant 26% once I allow the errors to be
correlated between remarriage and enrollment (ρ12 =.31**).9
In Table 5, for educated widows, in probit estimates of child school enrollment that
do not correct for endogeneity, remarriage appears harmful to child school enrollment.
Once I jointly estimate the enrollment and remarriage equations, the bivariate probit
marginal effect of remarriage on enrollment is negative but insignificant. Accounting
for the correlation in unobservables matters, but not without also exploiting exogenous
variation in male HIV rates do I capture the positive effect of remarriage on child
schooling for educated widows.
Lastly, Table 6 explores the child schooling decision among married couples. I present
probit marginal effects on a sample of 1,634 children of remarried mothers, including
controls for the widow and her husband in addition to those used in Table 5. In column
(1), each additional year of a mother’s schooling and separately her husband’s schooling
increases the likelihood of her child’s school enrollment by 6%. There are decreasing
returns to scale, however, as each additional combined year of schooling decreases en-
rollment by nearly 1%. In column (2), a remarried mother who is educated (has six or
more years of schooling) is 77% more likely to enroll her child in school, a remarried
9That the bivariate probit marginal effects are nearly equal to the three-stage MLE estimates for
uneducated widows suggests that the error covariance in the first and third as well as second and third
equations is not strong; this is confirmed by the estimated covariance matrix.
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mother whose husband is educated is 33% more likely to enroll her child in school, yet
if both are educated school enrollment is 90% less likely.
In column (3), I add interactions of the educated mother binary and the column (1)
controls. Each additional year of a mother’s and her husband’s schooling increases the
child enrollment likelihood by an insignificant 8% and a significant 10%, respectively,
with a decreasing returns to scale effect of negative 2%. Among educated mothers,
each additional year of her and her husband’s schooling has no effect and a negative
15% effect, respectively, with an increasing returns to scale effect of positive 2.5%; i.e.
there is complementarity in the returns to “educated parental schooling” on child school
enrollment.
In column (4), if an uneducated mother’s husband works in agriculture and she does
not, the child is a significant 24% less likely to be enrolled. This is in line with lower
expected child school enrollment (and higher child manual labor) among uneducated
widows who marry men in subsistence agriculture. Additionally, among educated wid-
ows, if either the child’s mother or the mother’s husband works in agriculture, the child
enrollment likelihood doubles, yet the effect is completely wiped out if both work in
agriculture.
In column (5), an educated widow who inherited any of her late husband’s property
after his death is 1.5 times more likely to enroll her child in school; there is no effect
for uneducated widows. Intuitively, inheritance denotes property ownership at the time
of marriage, a huge boost to one’s outside option and bargaining power. This estimate
displays the largest positive effect on enrollment thus far, on a sample of children whose
remarried mothers reported the amount of property inherited from their late husband
(N=923).
The column (6) estimates are on a sample of children whose remarried mothers and
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their husbands consented to HIV testing (N=632). An HIV-positive mother is 58% more
likely to enroll her child in school.10 Column (7) adds interactions of the educated mother
binary and the column (6) controls. If an educated mother’s husband is HIV-positive
and she is not, her child’s enrollment likelihood is tripled, and if both are HIV-positive,
enrollment likelihood is a fifth of what it otherwise would have been.11
The married-couple results indicate that a mother’s schooling is beneficial to her
child’s education not only directly but additionally through her desirability as a wife
to partners who have a similar education and taste for schooling; the further (indirect)
payoff is that her husband’s schooling additionally increases the likelihood of her child’s
school enrollment. Yet for uneducated widows who marry men working in subsistence
agriculture, remarriage is harmful to schooling prospects.
2.5 Conclusion
In Sub Saharan Africa, the sheer quantity and percentage of children who have lost
one or both parents is enormous. For example, 15% of school-aged children are orphans
in the sample of ten African countries I analyze. What is striking is not just the size of
this vulnerable population, but the disparity in current and future outcomes between
orphans and non-orphans. Orphans are less likely to be enrolled in school as children and
10If the mother’s husband is HIV-positive, the child is an insignificant 68% more likely to be enrolled,
and if both are HIV-positive, the likelihood of enrollment is reduced by an insignificant 47%.
11If the mother, her husband, or both are HIV-positive, the likelihood of her child’s school enrollment
is increased by an insignificant 43%, 66%, and 51%, respectively. If an HIV-positive mother is educated,
enrollment likelihood is increased by an insignificant 33%. Other notable married-couple results (not
shown) that are beneficial to child school enrollment if the mother has six or more years of schooling
but have no effect if the mother has less than six years of schooling include polygamy, mother as the
household head and grandparents living in the house.
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by the time they are adults, they have fewer years of schooling, are shorter (suggestive
of malnourishment since the parent’s death), and are more likely to live in poverty [4].
From my ten-country sample of orphans, 58% are paternal orphans, 22% are maternal
orphans and 20% are double orphans. That there are nearly three times as many paternal
orphans as there are maternal or double orphans can be attributed to higher male than
female death rates in areas that have experienced armed combat and high HIV rates. In
seven of the ten countries in my sample, AIDS is the leading or second leading cause of
death; these AIDS deaths were primarily concentrated among males.12 This is because
most men marry younger women in Sub Saharan Africa and are more likely to be HIV-
infected and die before their wives.13 It is not unusual, then, for women to be widowed
relatively young in Sub Saharan Africa and have school-aged children. What is crucial
is knowing whether widows can take some action to increase the likelihood of enrolling
their children in school.
I build on the finding in the parental death literature that, relative to non-orphans,
children are no less likely (or marginally less likely) to be enrolled in school if their father
died but are significantly less likely to be enrolled if their mother died [16], [23], [30].
This masks important enrollment differences across households who experienced the loss
of a father.
In this paper, I estimate the effect of a widowed mother’s remarriage on her child’s
school enrollment by using exogenous variation in HIV, religion, and sex ratios across
12HIV rates skyrocketed from the 1980s-90s and, since there was roughly a ten-year gap from the time
of HIV infection to AIDS death before HIV medication, with a lag of about ten years, AIDS deaths
soared from the 1990s-2000s.
13At the time of marriage, men have longer pre-marital sexual histories than their wives and, during
marriage, are more likely to have extramarital partners; relative to their wives, they are more likely to
be HIV-infected and die first.
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regions within a country, among a sample of school-aged children whose fathers died
but are living with their mother. My empirical results indicate that widow remarriage
decreases the likelihood of child school enrollment by 27% for less-educated widows but
increases the likelihood of child school enrollment by 15% for more-educated widows.
This is consistent with marital sorting by education, intra-household bargaining,
and/or differences in tastes for schooling and remarriage. The positive effect of remar-
riage among educated widows only appears once I correct for endogeneity.14 Educated
widows are a better “catch” in the marriage market, have higher outside options and
therefore a lower cost of continuing to search; unless they find an equally well-educated
man, they need not marry.15 It is easier for well-educated, less resource-constrained cou-
ples to enroll her children in school than it is for educated widows who do not remarry.
It could be that spousal preferences coincide on child education as a high-priority, or
that spousal preferences differ on the relative marginal returns to the education of each
child, but the household is not resource-constrained and each of her children’s expected
marginal return to schooling is higher than the marginal cost.
On the other hand, uneducated widows have fewer outside options, a lower option
value, and so a higher cost of continuing to search; they may lower their reservation
value of partner quality and end up accepting an uneducated male. While uneducated
widows may enter remarriage voluntarily at the interest of household welfare, it may be
at the cost of enrolling her children in school. That remarriage is detrimental to child
school enrollment for uneducated widows informs that either (1) spousal preferences
14This is due to an unobserved correlation between remarriage and enrollment – between a woman’s
characteristics as a mother and a wife. Among educated widows, the negative correlation proxies for
greater outside options and independence, while for uneducated widows, the positive correlation proxies
for hardships/undesirableness as a wife and education as a low-priority.
15The educated that choose to marry can be thought of as finding a “good match.”
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differ and, likely, his bargaining power trumps hers, or (2) spousal preferences coincide
and child education is equally a low-priority.
A policy implication is that there is a multiplier effect on investment in female
education in high-HIV areas – where females are more likely to become widows and the
prevalence of orphans and widows is highest. Targeting investments in female education
by reducing school fees, providing school uniforms or even deworming in high-HIV areas
can aid a widowed mother in increasing intergenerational mobility in her family. Given
the complementarity in the returns to education on marriage market outcomes and
children’s education, the widow’s daughter could be the first in her family to complete
primary school, marry an educated male and provide her own children with a higher
education one day.
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Table 1. Summary  Statistics of Variables Used in Estimation
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Child-Level
Child is Currently Enrolled in School 5651 0.70 0.46 0 1
Child's Age 5651 10.15 2.54 6 14
Birth Order Among Biological Siblings 5651 1.81 0.95 1 7
Child is Female Binary 5651 0.50 0.50 0 1
Mother-Level
Mother is Married 5651 0.27 0.44 0 1
Mother's Age 5651 37.91 6.40 18 49
Mother's Years of Schooling 5651 3.67 4.03 0 19
Mother has 6+ Years of Schooling 5651 0.36 0.48 0 1
Mother is HIV-Positive 3330 0.33 0.47 0 1
Household-Level
# School-Aged Paternal Orphans in Household 5651 2.25 1.06 1 8
# Other Children in Household 5651 1.92 2.19 0 29
Household Durable Assets Quintile 5651 2.84 1.42 1 5
Region-Rural Level
Male HIV Rate 5651 0.07 0.07 0 0.38
Male Circumcision Rate 5651 0.54 0.41 0.02 1
Male Years of Schooling 5651 5.70 2.70 0.64 10.70
Male Employment Rate 5651 0.68 0.16 0.25 0.95
Percent Muslim 5597 0.28 0.37 0 1
Sex Ratio in 10-Year Age Group 5651 1.21 0.36 0.40 4.33
Rural Binary 5651 0.73 0.44 0 1
Note: Weighted with household weights
80
T
a
b
le
 2
. 
Id
e
n
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 T
e
st
s.
 F
ir
st
-S
ta
g
e
 R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
 R
e
su
lt
s,
 u
si
n
g
 L
im
it
e
d
 I
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 M
a
xi
m
u
m
 L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
 E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
M
o
th
e
r 
R
e
m
a
rr
ie
d
 B
in
a
ry
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
M
a
le
 H
IV
 R
a
te
E
d
u
ca
te
d
U
n
e
d
u
ca
te
d
E
d
u
ca
te
d
U
n
e
d
u
ca
te
d
F
it
te
d
 M
a
le
 H
IV
 R
a
te
-6
.2
4
*
*
3
.2
1
*
*
M
a
le
 C
ir
cu
m
ci
si
o
n
 R
a
te
-0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
6
*
*
*
(2
.5
5
)
(1
.5
5
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
M
u
sl
im
0
.1
9
*
0
.1
1
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
M
u
sl
im
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
3
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
S
e
x 
R
a
ti
o
0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
S
e
x 
R
a
ti
o
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
M
a
le
 A
v
e
ra
g
e
 Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
-0
.0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
M
a
le
 A
v
e
ra
g
e
 Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
-0
.0
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
3
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
M
a
le
 E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
R
a
te
0
.4
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
M
a
le
 E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
R
a
te
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
6
*
*
*
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
R
u
ra
l 
B
in
a
ry
-0
.4
4
*
*
0
.1
8
*
*
R
u
ra
l 
B
in
a
ry
-0
.0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
*
*
*
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
A
g
e
-0
.0
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
*
*
*
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
A
g
e
-0
.0
0
0
4
*
-0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
#
 S
ch
o
o
l-
A
g
e
d
 P
a
te
rn
a
l 
O
rp
h
a
n
s 
in
 H
H
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
*
#
 S
ch
o
o
l-
A
g
e
d
 P
a
te
rn
a
l 
O
rp
h
a
n
s 
in
 H
H
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
1
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
#
 O
th
e
r 
C
h
il
d
re
n
 i
n
 H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
0
.0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
#
 O
th
e
r 
C
h
il
d
re
n
 i
n
 H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
N
1
9
2
3
3
6
6
9
N
1
9
2
3
3
6
6
9
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.0
9
0
.1
5
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.7
3
0
.8
3
U
n
d
e
ri
d
e
n
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 T
e
st
: 
K
-P
 L
M
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
7
.9
 (
.0
5
)
8
.1
 (
.0
4
)
U
n
d
e
ri
d
e
n
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 T
e
st
: 
K
-P
 L
M
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
4
.2
 (
.0
4
)
2
5
.9
 (
.0
0
)
W
e
a
k
 I
d
e
n
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 T
e
st
: 
A
-P
 F
 t
e
st
3
.0
 (
.0
3
)
2
.7
 (
.0
5
)
W
e
a
k
 I
d
e
n
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 T
e
st
: 
A
-P
 F
 t
e
st
5
.2
 (
.0
2
)
1
8
.6
 (
.0
0
)
O
v
e
ri
d
e
n
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 T
e
st
: 
H
a
n
se
n
 J
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
0
.4
 (
.8
4
)
2
.0
 (
.3
6
)
O
v
e
ri
d
e
n
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 T
e
st
: 
H
a
n
se
n
 J
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
0
.0
0
.0
N
o
te
: 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 i
n
cl
u
d
e
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
, 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 w
e
a
lt
h
 q
u
in
ti
le
, 
a
n
d
 c
h
il
d
 a
g
e
 f
ix
e
d
 e
ff
e
ct
s,
 a
n
d
 c
h
il
d
 g
e
n
d
e
r 
b
in
a
ry
. 
B
ir
th
 o
rd
e
r 
e
ff
e
ct
s 
a
re
 p
a
rt
ia
ll
e
d
 o
u
t.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 a
re
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s 
u
n
d
e
r 
e
st
im
a
te
s 
a
n
d
 c
lu
st
e
re
d
 a
t 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 l
e
v
e
l;
 p
-v
a
lu
e
s 
a
re
 n
e
xt
 t
o
 t
e
st
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s.
 
81
T
a
b
le
 3
. 
M
a
xi
m
u
m
 L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
 E
st
im
a
te
s 
o
f 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t,
 b
y
 M
o
th
e
r'
s 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
T
h
ir
d
-S
ta
g
e
 P
ro
b
it
 M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
ct
s:
 C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t 
B
in
a
ry
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
M
o
th
e
r 
R
e
m
a
rr
ie
d
 B
in
a
ry
-0
.1
4
-0
.5
3
*
*
*
0
.1
2
*
-0
.4
5
*
*
*
0
.1
6
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
*
*
*
0
.1
5
*
*
-0
.2
7
*
*
*
(0
.8
9
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.1
0
)
S
e
co
n
d
-S
ta
g
e
 P
ro
b
it
 M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
ct
s:
 M
o
th
e
r 
R
e
m
a
rr
ie
d
 B
in
a
ry
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
M
a
le
 H
IV
 R
a
te
-0
.9
1
-0
.8
8
*
*
*
-9
.8
9
*
*
*
2
.6
5
*
-4
.8
1
1
.7
1
-2
.2
1
1
.3
6
(1
.2
3
)
(0
.3
2
)
(0
.8
9
)
(1
.5
7
)
(4
.4
2
)
(1
.9
5
)
(6
.2
6
)
(1
.9
4
)
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
M
u
sl
im
0
.0
6
0
.1
8
*
*
*
0
.5
7
*
*
0
.1
5
*
0
.2
7
*
0
.1
3
0
.2
0
*
0
.1
5
(0
.2
0
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.2
5
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
5
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
9
)
S
e
x 
R
a
ti
o
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
6
*
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
0
5
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
2
)
F
ir
st
-S
ta
g
e
 O
LS
 E
st
im
a
te
s:
 M
a
le
 H
IV
 R
a
te
, 
in
 R
e
g
io
n
-R
u
ra
l 
A
re
a
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
E
d
u
c
U
n
e
d
u
c
M
a
le
 C
ir
cu
m
ci
si
o
n
 R
a
te
-0
.1
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
.0
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 F
ix
e
d
 E
ff
e
ct
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
R
e
g
io
n
-R
u
ra
l 
Le
v
e
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
H
H
 a
n
d
 C
h
il
d
-L
e
v
e
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
1
9
5
4
3
6
9
7
1
9
5
4
3
6
9
7
1
9
5
4
3
6
9
7
1
9
5
4
3
6
9
7
co
rr
(u
1
,u
2
)
0
.0
9
1
.3
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
6
0
.7
3
*
*
*
-0
.8
6
*
0
.5
4
*
*
*
-1
.2
3
*
0
.3
5
*
co
rr
(u
1
,u
3
)
0
.0
5
0
.1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
0
.0
8
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
*
*
0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
0
.0
1
co
rr
(u
2
,u
3
)
0
.2
1
0
.1
7
*
*
*
2
.4
1
*
-0
.1
3
0
.7
2
-0
.0
4
0
.3
8
-0
.0
3
N
o
te
: 
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 a
re
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s 
a
n
d
 c
lu
st
e
re
d
 a
t 
th
e
 H
H
 l
e
v
e
l.
 C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 a
re
 a
d
d
e
d
 t
o
 a
ll
 s
ta
g
e
s.
  
H
H
-l
e
v
e
l 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 i
n
cl
u
d
e
 
H
H
 w
e
a
lt
h
 q
u
in
ti
le
 f
ix
e
d
 e
ff
e
ct
s,
 #
 s
ch
o
o
l-
a
g
e
d
 p
a
te
rn
a
l 
o
rp
h
a
n
s 
a
n
d
 #
 o
th
e
r 
ch
il
d
re
n
 i
n
 H
H
, 
a
n
d
 m
o
th
e
r'
s 
a
g
e
. 
C
h
il
d
-l
e
v
e
l 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
in
cl
u
d
e
 c
h
il
d
 a
g
e
 a
n
d
 b
ir
th
 o
rd
e
r 
fi
xe
d
 e
ff
e
ct
s 
a
n
d
 c
h
il
d
 g
e
n
d
e
r.
 R
e
g
io
n
-r
u
ra
l 
le
v
e
l 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 i
n
 t
h
e
 1
st
 a
n
d
 3
rd
 s
ta
g
e
s 
a
re
 a
d
u
lt
 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
s;
 1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 s
ta
g
e
s 
a
re
 m
a
le
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 r
a
te
s,
 %
 M
u
sl
im
 a
n
d
 s
e
x 
ra
ti
o
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
82
T
a
b
le
 4
. 
M
a
xi
m
u
m
 L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
 E
st
im
a
te
s 
o
f 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t,
 V
a
ry
in
g
 M
o
th
e
r'
s 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 C
u
to
ff
T
h
ir
d
-S
ta
g
e
 R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
, 
P
ro
b
it
 M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
ct
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t 
B
in
a
ry
E
d
u
c:
 5
+
U
n
e
d
u
c:
 <
5
E
d
u
c:
 6
+
U
n
e
d
u
c:
 <
6
E
d
u
c:
 7
+
U
n
e
d
u
c:
 <
7
M
o
th
e
r 
R
e
m
a
rr
ie
d
 B
in
a
ry
0
.1
7
*
*
-0
.1
8
0
.1
5
*
*
-0
.2
7
*
*
*
0
.1
2
-0
.2
3
*
*
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
0
)
A
d
u
lt
 Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
, 
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 i
n
 R
e
g
io
n
-R
u
ra
l 
A
re
a
0
.0
2
0
.0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
0
.0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.0
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
A
d
u
lt
 E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
R
a
te
, 
in
 R
e
g
io
n
-R
u
ra
l 
A
re
a
-0
.1
5
0
.1
9
-0
.0
7
0
.1
3
-0
.0
5
0
.1
1
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.1
6
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
5
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
5
)
R
u
ra
l 
B
in
a
ry
0
.0
5
0
.1
4
*
*
0
.0
5
0
.1
5
*
*
0
.0
7
*
0
.1
4
*
*
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
6
)
#
 S
ch
o
o
l-
A
g
e
d
 P
a
te
rn
a
l 
O
rp
h
a
n
s 
in
 H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
0
.0
1
-0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
1
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
#
 O
th
e
r 
C
h
il
d
re
n
 i
n
 H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
-0
.0
1
*
*
-0
.0
1
*
-0
.0
2
*
*
-0
.0
1
*
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
1
*
*
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
N
2
2
7
4
3
3
7
7
1
9
5
4
3
6
9
7
1
6
9
7
3
9
5
4
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
N
o
te
: 
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 a
re
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s 
a
n
d
 c
lu
st
e
re
d
 a
t 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 l
e
v
e
l.
 C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 i
n
cl
u
d
e
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
, 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 w
e
a
lt
h
 q
u
in
ti
le
, 
ch
il
d
 a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 b
ir
th
 o
rd
e
r 
fi
xe
d
 e
ff
e
ct
s,
 a
 c
h
il
d
 g
e
n
d
e
r 
b
in
a
ry
 a
n
d
 m
o
th
e
r'
s 
a
g
e
.
83
T
a
b
le
 5
. 
E
st
im
a
te
s 
o
f 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t,
 B
e
fo
re
 a
n
d
 A
ft
e
r 
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 f
o
r 
E
n
d
o
g
e
n
e
it
y
T
h
ir
d
-S
ta
g
e
: 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t 
B
in
a
ry
M
o
th
e
r 
R
e
m
a
rr
ie
d
 B
in
a
ry
-0
.3
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
0
.1
5
*
*
-0
.1
5
*
*
-0
.2
6
*
*
-0
.2
7
*
*
*
(0
.1
3
)
(0
.4
6
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
0
)
S
e
co
n
d
-S
ta
g
e
: 
M
o
th
e
r 
R
e
m
a
rr
ie
d
 B
in
a
ry
M
a
le
 H
IV
 R
a
te
0
.6
8
-2
.2
1
1
.0
1
*
*
1
.3
6
(0
.5
0
)
(6
.2
6
)
(0
.4
9
)
(1
.9
4
)
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
M
u
sl
im
0
.1
4
0
.2
0
*
0
.1
5
*
0
.1
5
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.0
9
)
S
e
x 
R
a
ti
o
0
.0
5
*
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
5
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
F
ir
st
-S
ta
g
e
: 
M
a
le
 H
IV
 R
a
te
, 
in
 R
e
g
io
n
-R
u
ra
l 
A
re
a
M
a
le
 C
ir
cu
m
ci
si
o
n
 R
a
te
-0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
N
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
4
3
6
9
3
3
6
9
7
3
6
9
7
co
rr
(u
1
,u
2
)
0
.2
9
-1
.2
3
*
0
.3
1
*
0
.3
5
*
co
rr
(u
1
,u
3
)
-0
.1
0
0
.0
1
co
rr
(u
2
,u
3
)
0
.3
8
-0
.0
3
P
ro
b
it
 M
a
rg
 
E
ff
e
ct
s
B
iv
a
ri
a
te
 
P
ro
b
it
 M
E
 
T
h
re
e
-S
ta
g
e
 
M
LE
N
o
te
: 
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 a
re
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s 
a
n
d
 c
lu
st
e
re
d
 a
t 
th
e
 H
H
 l
e
v
e
l.
 A
ll
 s
ta
g
e
s 
in
cl
u
d
e
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 f
o
r 
co
u
n
tr
y
, 
H
H
 w
e
a
lt
h
 
q
u
in
ti
le
, 
ch
il
d
 a
g
e
 &
 b
ir
th
 o
rd
e
r 
fi
xe
d
 e
ff
e
ct
s,
 c
h
il
d
 g
e
n
d
e
r,
 r
u
ra
l,
 m
o
th
e
r'
s 
a
g
e
, 
#
 s
ch
o
o
l-
a
g
e
d
 p
a
te
rn
a
l 
o
rp
h
a
n
s 
&
 o
th
e
r 
ch
il
d
re
n
 
in
 H
H
. 
 1
st
 &
 3
rd
 s
ta
g
e
s 
in
cl
u
d
e
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 f
o
r 
a
d
u
lt
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
&
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 r
a
te
s;
 1
st
 &
 2
n
d
 s
ta
g
e
s 
fo
r 
m
a
le
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 r
a
te
s,
 %
 M
u
sl
im
 &
 s
e
x 
ra
ti
o
.
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 W
id
o
w
s
U
n
e
d
u
ca
te
d
 W
id
o
w
s
P
ro
b
it
 M
a
rg
 
E
ff
e
ct
s
B
iv
a
ri
a
te
 
P
ro
b
it
 M
E
 
T
h
re
e
-S
ta
g
e
 
M
LE
84
T
a
b
le
 6
. 
M
a
rr
ie
d
 C
o
u
p
le
s.
 P
ro
b
it
 M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
f 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t
T
a
b
le
 6
. 
M
a
rr
ie
d
 C
o
u
p
le
s.
 P
ro
b
it
 M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
f 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t 
B
in
a
ry
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
C
h
il
d
 S
ch
o
o
l 
E
n
ro
ll
m
e
n
t 
B
in
a
ry
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
0
.0
6
*
0
.0
8
M
o
th
e
r 
In
h
e
ri
te
d
 A
n
y
 P
ro
p
e
rt
y
 f
ro
m
 L
a
te
 H
u
sb
a
n
d
-0
.0
9
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.1
8
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
's
 Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
0
.0
6
*
*
*
0
.1
0
*
*
*
1
.5
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.4
9
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
*
H
u
sb
a
n
d
's
 Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
-0
.0
1
*
-0
.0
2
*
*
M
o
th
e
r 
is
 H
IV
-P
o
si
ti
v
e
0
.5
8
*
*
0
.4
3
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.2
5
)
(0
.3
0
)
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
0
.7
7
*
*
*
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 i
s 
H
IV
-P
o
si
ti
v
e
0
.6
8
0
.6
6
(0
.2
7
)
(0
.4
9
)
(0
.5
1
)
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 B
in
a
ry
0
.3
3
*
B
o
th
 M
o
th
e
r 
a
n
d
 h
e
r 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 a
re
 H
IV
-P
o
si
ti
v
e
-0
.4
7
0
.5
1
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.6
3
)
(0
.6
9
)
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 B
in
a
ry
-0
.9
0
*
*
*
M
o
th
e
r 
is
 H
IV
-P
o
si
ti
v
e
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
0
.3
3
(0
.3
2
)
(0
.3
6
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
0
.0
0
4
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 i
s 
H
IV
-P
o
si
ti
v
e
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
2
.9
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.5
9
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
's
 Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
-0
.1
5
*
*
*
-4
.6
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.9
1
)
0
.0
2
*
*
(0
.0
1
)
M
o
th
e
r 
W
o
rk
s 
in
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
-0
.3
1
(0
.2
3
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 W
o
rk
s 
in
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
-0
.2
4
*
(0
.1
4
)
M
o
th
e
r 
W
o
rk
s 
in
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
*
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 W
o
rk
s 
in
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
0
.3
5
(0
.2
6
)
M
o
th
e
r 
W
o
rk
s 
in
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
0
.9
9
*
*
*
(0
.3
8
)
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 W
o
rk
s 
in
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
1
.1
0
*
*
*
(0
.4
1
)
-2
.4
2
*
*
*
(0
.6
2
)
N
1
4
8
1
1
4
8
1
1
4
8
1
1
3
6
2
M
o
th
e
r 
In
h
e
ri
te
d
 A
n
y
 P
ro
p
e
rt
y
 f
ro
m
 L
a
te
 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
B
o
th
 M
o
th
e
r 
a
n
d
 h
e
r 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 a
re
 H
IV
-P
o
si
ti
v
e
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 
M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
*
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
's
 Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
N
o
te
: 
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 a
re
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s 
a
n
d
 c
lu
st
e
re
d
 a
t 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 l
e
v
e
l.
 C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 f
o
r 
a
ll
 
T
a
b
le
 6
 r
e
g
re
ss
io
n
s 
in
cl
u
d
e
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
, 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 w
e
a
lt
h
 q
u
in
ti
le
, 
ch
il
d
 a
g
e
 a
n
d
 b
ir
th
 o
rd
e
r 
fi
xe
d
 
e
ff
e
ct
s,
 b
in
a
ry
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
fo
r 
ch
il
d
 g
e
n
d
e
r 
a
n
d
 r
u
ra
l,
 m
o
th
e
r'
s 
a
g
e
, 
a
d
u
lt
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
 a
n
d
 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
 y
e
a
rs
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
, 
a
n
d
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
sc
h
o
o
l-
a
g
e
d
 p
a
te
rn
a
l 
o
rp
h
a
n
s 
a
n
d
 o
th
e
r 
ch
il
d
re
n
 i
n
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
.
M
o
th
e
r 
W
o
rk
s 
in
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
*
M
o
th
e
r'
s 
H
u
sb
a
n
d
 W
o
rk
s 
in
 
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
*
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 M
o
th
e
r 
B
in
a
ry
6
3
2
6
3
2
9
2
3
N
85
Bibliography
[1] Ainsworth, M., K. Beegle and G. Koda. 2005. Parental Deaths in North-Western
Tanzania, Journal of Development Studies 41: pp. 41239.
[2] Bailey, Robert C., Stephen Moses, Corette B Parker, Kawango Agot, Ian Maclean,
John N Krieger, Carolyn F M Williams, Richard T Campbell, Jeckoniah O Ndinya-
Achola. 2007. Male circumcision for HIV prevention in young men in Kisumu,
Kenya: a randomised controlled trial. Lance; 369: 643-56.
[3] BBC News. 2006, December 13. Male circumcision ’cuts’ HIV risk.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6176209.stm
[4] Beegle, Kathleen, Joachim De Weerdt and Stefan Dercon. Orphanhood and Human
Capital Destruction: Is there Persistence into Adulthood? Demography, Volume
47-Number 1, February 2010: 163180.
[5] Behrman, Jere. Schooling and Other Human Capital Investments: Can the Effects
be Identified? Economics of Education Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 301-305, 1987.
[6] Behrman, Jere R., Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Paul Taubman. Endowments and the
Allocation of Schooling in the Family and in the Marriage Market: The Twins
Experiment. Journal of Political Economy, 1994, vol. 102, no. 6.
86
[7] Behrman, Jere R. Mother’s Schooling and Child Education: A Survey. 1997. Penn
Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 97-025.
[8] Behrman, Jere R. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. Does Increasing Women’s Schooling
Raise the Schooling of the Next Generation? The American Economic Review, Vol.
92, No. 1 (Mar., 2002), pp. 323-334.
[9] Behrman, Jere R., Andrew D. Foster, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Prem Vashishtha.
Women’s Schooling, Home Teaching, and Economic Growth. The Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, Vol. 107, No. 4 (August 1999), pp. 682-714.
[10] Birdsall, Nancy. Public Inputs and Child Schooling in Brazil. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 18 (1985) 67-86.
[11] Black, Sandra E., Paul J. Devereux and Kjell G. Salvanes. Why the Apple Doesn’t
Fall Far: Understanding Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital. The
American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Mar., 2005), pp. 437-449.
[12] Black, Sandra E., Paul J. Devereux, Kjell G. Salvanes. The More the Merrier?
The Effect of Family Size and Birth Order on Chidren’s Education. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, May 2005.
[13] Boulier, Bryan L. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. Schooling, Search, and Spouse Selec-
tion: Testing Economic Theories of Marriage and Household Behavior. The Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 92, No. 4 (Aug., 1984), pp. 712-732.
[14] Buchmann, Claudia. Family Structure, Parental Perceptions, and Child Labor in
Kenya: What Factors Determine Who is Enrolled in School? Social Forces, Vol.
78, No. 4 (Jun., 2000), pp. 1349-1378.
87
[15] Case, Anne, Christina Paxson, and Joseph Ableidinger. Orphans in Africa: Parental
Death, Poverty, and School Enrollment. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Aug., 2004),
pp. 483-508.
[16] Case, Anne and Cally Ardington. The Impact of Parental Death on School Out-
comes: Longitudinal Evidence from South Africa. Demography, Volume 43-Number
3, August 2006: pp. 401420.
[17] Chernichovsky, Dov. Socioeconomic and Demographic Aspects of School Enroll-
ment and Attendance in Rural Botswana. Economic Development and Cultural
Change, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jan., 1985), pp. 319-332.
[18] Cleland, John G. and Jerome K. van Ginneken. Maternal Education and Child
Survival in Developing Countries: The Search for Pathways of Influence. Social
Science Medicine. Vol. 27, No. 12, pp. 1357-1368, 1988.
[19] Desai, Sonalde and Soumya Alva. Maternal Education and Child Health: Is There
a Strong Causal Relationship? Demography, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 71-81.
[20] DHS datasets, www.measuredhs.com, MEASURE DHS, Macro International, Inc.
[21] Downey, Douglas B. Understanding Academic Achievement among Children in
Stephouseholds: The Role of Parental Resources, Sex of Stepparent, and Sex of
Child. Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Mar., 1995), pp. 875-894.
[22] Emerson, Patrick M. and Andrew Portela Souza. Birth Order, Child Labor, and
School Attendance in Brazil. World Development Vol. 36, No. 9, pp. 1647-1664,
2008.
[23] Evans, David K. and Edward Miguel. Orphans and Schooling in Africa: A Longi-
tudinal Analysis. Demography, Volume 44-Number 1, February 2007: pp. 3557.
88
[24] Foster, Andrew D. Marriage-Market Selection and Human Capital Allocations in
Rural Bangladesh. Working Paper. 2002.
[25] Gertler, Paul, David I. Levine, and Minnie Ames. Schooling and Parental Death.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2004, 86(1): pp. 211225.
[26] Gertler, Paul, Sebastian Martinez, David Levine, Stefano Bertozzi. Lost Presence
and Presents of Parents: How Parental Death Affects Children. March 2004 Work-
ing Paper.
[27] Glewwe, Paul and Hanan Jacoby. Student Achievement and Schooling Choice in
Low-Income Countries: Evidence from Ghana. The Journal of Human Resources,
Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer, 1994), pp. 843-864.
[28] Glick, Peter and David E. Sahn. Schooling of girls and boys in a West African coun-
try: the effects of parental education, income, and household structure. Economics
of Education Review 19 (2000) 63-87.
[29] Himaz, Rozana. The impact of parental death on schooling and subjective wellbeing:
Evidence from Ethiopia using longitudinal data. Published in: Young Lives Working
Paper Series, University of Oxford No. 44 (2009).
[30] Jayne, Thomas S. and Takashi Yamano. Working-Age Adult Mortality and Primary
School Attendance in Rural Kenya. Economic Development and Cultural Change,
2005, vol. 53, issue 3, pages 619-53.
[31] Jeynes, William H. Does Widowhood or Remarriage Have the Greater Impact on
the Academic Achievement of Children? OMEGA, Vol. 44(4) 319-343, 2001-2002.
89
[32] Keith, Verna M. and Barbara Finlay. The Impact of Parental Divorce on Children’s
Educational Attainment, Marital Timing, and Likelihood of Divorce. Journal of
Marriage and Family, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Aug., 1988), pp. 797-809.
[33] Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak. Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Mar-
riage Market. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 6 (Dec., 1993), pp.
988-1010.
[34] Sear, Rebecca, Ruth Mace and Ian A. McGregor. Maternal grandmothers improve
nutritional status and survival of children in rural Gambia. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B
2000 267, 1641-1647.
[35] Sear, Rebecca and Ruth Mace. Who keeps children alive? A review of the effects
of kin on child survival. Evolution and Human Behavior 29 (2008) 118.
[36] Oreopoulos, Philip, Marianne E. Page, and Ann Huff Stevens. The Intergenerational
Effects of Compulsory Schooling. Journal of Labor Economics, 2006, vol. 24, no. 4.
[37] Parish, William L. and Robert J. Willis. 1993. Daughters, Education, and Fam-
ily Budgets Taiwan Experiences. The Journal of Human Resources, Special Issue:
Symposium on Investments in Women’s Human Capital and Development, Vol. 28,
No. 4, pp. 863-898.
[38] Phillips, Shannon. 2011 Working Paper. The Effect of HIV on Marriage in Zambia.
[39] Quisumbing, Agnes R. and Keijiro Otsuka. 2001. Land Inheritance and Schooling
in Matrilineal Societies: Evidence from Sumatra. World Development. Vol. 29, No.
12, pp. 2093-2110.
[40] Quisumbing, Agnes R. and John A. Maluccio. Resources at Marriage and Intra-
household Allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South
90
Africa. OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 65, 3 (2003)
0305-9049.
[41] Roodman, D. 2009. Estimating fully observed recursive mixed-process models with
cmp. Working Paper 168. Center for Global Development. Washington, DC.
[42] Singh, Ram D. Underinvestment, Low Economic Returns to Education, and the
Schooling of Rural Children: Some Evidence from Brazil. Economic Development
and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Apr., 1992), pp. 645-664.
[43] Tansel, Aysit. Schooling Attainment, Parental Education, and Gender in Cte
d’Ivoire and Ghana. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 45, No.
4 (July 1997), pp. 825-856.
[44] Word Health Organanization Mortality Profiles
http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/
[45] Yamano, Takashi. The long-term impacts of orphanhood on education attainment
and land inheritance among adults in rural Kenya. Agricultural Economics 37
(2007), pp. 141149.
91
